Comparing nuclear power trajectories in Germany and the UK: from ‘regimes' to ‘democracies’ in sociotechnical transitions

and Discontinuities by Johnstone, Philip & Stirling, Andrew
Comparing Nuclear Power Trajectories in 
Germany And the UK: From ‘Regimes’ to 
‘Democracies’ in Sociotechnical Transitions 
and Discontinuities     
 
Phil Johnstone, Andy Stirling    
SWPS 2015-18 ( June) 
Disclaimer 
The works available here are the responsibility of the individual author(s) and do not 
necessarily represent the views of other SPRU researchers. As matters of policy and practice, 
SPRU does not endorse individual research contributions. 
Guidelines for authors 
Papers shall be submitted in pdf or Word format. They should contain a title, an abstract, and 
keywords. Papers should be submitted to one of the Editors, who will process them and send 
them to the appropriate Associate Editor. Two members of SPRU will be asked to provide a 
short written review within three weeks. The revised versions of the paper, together with a 
reply to the reviewers, should be sent to the Associate Editor, who will propose to the Editors 
its publication on the series. When submitting the authors should indicate if the paper has 
already undergone peer-reviewing, in which case the Associate Editors may decide to skip 
internal review process. 
Websites 
SWPS: www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/research/swps 
IDEAS: ideas.repec.org/s/sru/ssewps.html 
Research Gate: www.researchgate.net/journal/2057-6668_SPRU_Working_Paper_Series 
Editors Contact 
Tommaso Ciarli T.Ciarli@sussex.ac.uk 
Daniele Rotolo D.Rotolo@sussex.ac.uk 
Associate Editors Area 
Florian Kern Energy F.Kern@sussex.ac.uk 
Paul Nightingale, 
Ben Martin, & 
Ohid Yaqub  
 
Science, & Technology Policy P.Nightingale@sussex.ac.uk 
B.Martin@sussex.ac.uk 
O.Yaqub@sussex.ac.uk 
Matias Ramirez Development Matias.Ramirez@sussex.ac.uk 
Joe Tidd & 
Carlos Sato 
 
Technology Innovation 
Management 
J.Tidd@sussex.ac.uk 
C.E.Y.Sato@sussex.ac.uk 
Maria Savona & 
Mariana Mazzucato 
 
Economics of Technological Change M.Savona@sussex.ac.uk 
M.Mazzucato@sussex.ac.uk 
Andrew Stirling Transitions A.C.Stirling@sussex.ac.uk 
Caitriona McLeish Civil military interface  C.A.McLeish@sussex.ac.uk 
SPRU Working Paper Series (ISSN 2057-6668) 
The SPRU Working Paper Series aims to accelerate the public availability of the research 
undertaken by SPRU-associated people of all categories, and exceptionally, other research 
that is of considerable interest within SPRU. It presents research results that in whole or part 
are suitable for submission to a refereed journal, to a sponsor, to a major conference or to the 
editor of a book. Our intention is to provide access to early copies of SPRU research. 
1 
 
COMPARING NUCLEAR POWER TRAJECTORIES IN GERMANY AND THE UK: 
from  ‘regimes’  to  ‘democracies’  in  sociotechnical  transitions  and  discontinuities 
Phil Johnstone¹,  Andy Stirling²,  SPRU, June2015 
 
¹Phil Johnstone        
Room 325, Jubilee Building 
Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) 
University of Sussex 
p.johnstone@sussex.ac.uk 
²Professor Andy Stirling 
Room 389, Jubilee Building 
Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) 
University of Sussex 
A.C.Stirling@sussex.ac.uk 
 
Keywords: democracy; transitions; nuclear power; UK; Germany; sustainability transitions 
Abstract 
This paper focuses on arguably the single most striking contrast in contemporary major energy politics in 
Europe (and even the developed world as a whole): the starkly differing civil nuclear policies of Germany and 
the UK. Germany is seeking entirely to phase out nuclear power by 2022. Yet the UK advocates a  ‘nuclear  
renaissance’, promoting the most ambitious new nuclear construction programme in Western Europe. Here, 
this paper poses a simple yet quite fundamental question: what are the particular divergent conditions most 
strongly implicated in the contrasting developments in these two countries. With nuclear playing such an 
iconic role in historical discussions over technological continuity and transformation, answering this may assist 
in wider understandings of sociotechnical incumbency and discontinuity in the burgeoning field of 
‘sustainability  transitions’.    To this end, an ‘abductive’  approach is taken: deploying nine potentially relevant 
criteria for understanding the different directions pursued in Germany and the UK. Together constituted by 30 
parameters spanning literatures related to socio-technical regimes in general as well as nuclear technology in 
particular, the criteria are divided into those that are ‘internal’  and  ‘external’  to  the  ‘focal  regime  
configuration’  of  nuclear  power  and  associated  ‘challenger  technologies’ like renewables. It  is  ‘internal’  criteria  
that are emphasised in conventional sociotechnical regime theory, with ‘external’  criteria  relatively  less  well  
explored. Asking under each criterion whether attempted discontinuation of nuclear power would be more 
likely in Germany or the UK, a clear picture emerges.  ‘Internal’  criteria suggest attempted nuclear 
discontinuation should be more likely in the UK than in Germany – the reverse of what is occurring. ‘External’  
criteria are more aligned with observed dynamics – especially those relating to military nuclear commitments 
and broader  ‘qualities  of  democracy’.  Despite many differences of framing concerning exactly what constitutes 
‘democracy’,  a  rich  political science literature on this point is unanimous in characterising Germany more 
positively than the UK. Although based only on a single case, a potentially important question is nonetheless 
raised as to whether sociotechnical regime theory might usefully give greater attention to the general 
importance of various aspects of democracy in constituting conditions for significant technological 
discontinuities and transformations. If so, the policy implications are significant. A number of important areas 
are identified for future research, including the roles of diverse understandings and specific aspects of 
democracy and the particular relevance of military nuclear commitments – whose under-discussion in civil 
nuclear policy literatures raises its own questions of democratic accountability.  
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EXTENDED ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on what is arguably the single most striking contrast in contemporary major energy politics 
in Europe (and even the developed world as a whole): the starkly differing nuclear policies of Germany and the 
UK. Germany is seeking entirely to discontinue nuclear power, aiming to phase the technology out by 2022. 
The UK professes the aim  of  a   ‘nuclear   renaissance’  and  plans   to  promote   the  most  ambitious  new  nuclear  
construction programme in Western Europe. With nuclear power continuing to assume such iconic cultural 
and political salience worldwide – and constituting such a significant part of these and other countries 
institutional and energy mixes – the stakes are high. 
This paper is based around a simple yet quite fundamental question: what are the particular divergent 
conditions that most contribute to producing such contrasting energy developments in these two countries?  
Answers to this question may assist in wider understandings and conceptualisations of sociotechnical 
incumbency and discontinuity. And they may be especially salient because – as we shall show – more fine-
grain appreciation of the circumstances of these two countries actually compound (rather than relax) the 
evident discrepancy. The present study seeks to address this by developing and applying nine criteria from a 
wide set of literatures concerned with explaining sociotechnical change. These are in turn constituted by 30 
more detailed parameters, designed to explore key relevant and visible factors bearing directly on nuclear 
incumbency and discontinuity in these two countries.  
The nine criteria are: 1) general market conditions in the two countries in respect of different kinds of capital 
investment in electricity supply; 2) the comparative degrees of penetration (and thus – to this extent – 
associated influence) of nuclear power in the electricity generating mix; 3) the relative strengths of national 
nuclear engineering sectors in terms of performance in manufacturing and operational equipment supply and 
associated industrial lobbies; 4) the relative magnitudes and costs of the available national renewable resource 
potentials; 5) the scale of established national industrial capacities and interests around technological 
alternatives to nuclear power as a low carbon energy option (including solar, wind, offshore technologies); 6) 
the relative scales of military-related nuclear activities and interests; 7) characteristics of relevant national 
political institutions and elite policy cultures and procedures;  8) public opinion and the broader presence and 
activity levels on the part of relevant anti-nuclear social movements; and 9) contrasts in variously-construed 
ideas of the respective overall ‘qualities  of  democracy’  in the two countries. Together, these address a range of 
factors that one literature or another has invoked in seeking to account for contrasting degrees of 
entrenchment around nuclear power (or, indeed, more generally). 
Despite the complexities, this ‘abductive  style’  analysis finds a relatively clear picture with respect to the first 
five criteria. These involve dynamics internal to the ‘focal   regime   configuration’  around nuclear power and 
associated – variously construable – nested or overarching concepts of ‘sociotechnical systems’,   ‘niches’  or 
‘challenger technologies’. On this basis, it might be expected that Germany would be significantly less likely 
than the UK to discontinue nuclear power. Indeed, these five criteria together might in this case be taken quite 
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confidently to predict the opposite of the observed pattern. Yet these criteria address the key basic ‘internal’  
factors that tend to be emphasised in conventional analyses of dynamics in sociotechnical regimes and 
sectoral   patterns   of   innovation.   In   short,   in   these   ‘conventional’   terms,   the   UK’s   renewed   enthusiasm   for  
nuclear in comparison  to  Germany’s  nuclear  phase-out seems rather hard to understand. 
It is under the remaining four criteria – relatively remote from the focal regime configuration around nuclear 
power – that seem to align more with the observed pattern of developments in the two countries. Particularly 
important here, are the strongly differing military nuclear strategies and the contrasting qualities of democracy 
in the two countries – which are alone in very clearly favouring the observed pattern of discontinuation in 
Germany rather than the UK. As correlation rather than causality, this does not definitively explain the 
contrast. But the fact is, that it seems in this important case of sociotechnical discontinuity, that the criteria 
representing the most potentially relevant drivers involve dynamics that are quite remote from the focal 
regime configuration.  
Of course, nuclear power (like all large infrastructures) displays many distinctive features. There are many 
ways in which this examination (like any analytical framework) might miss significant factors. But the fact that 
a pattern so challenging to theory should apply in such an important case, does raise potentially significant 
questions for conventional analysis of sectoral innovation and sociotechnical regimes in general. Crucial here is 
that the dynamics of the focal regime configurations do not seem merely to be of secondary importance, but 
are actually quite clearly aligned towards an entirely opposite outcome. So the observed pattern of events in 
this case, apparently suggest that broader political factors typically marginal to existing theory, actually 
dominate and reverse what would otherwise conventionally be expected to be the opposite picture.  
In this respect, the present analysis reinforces some wider emerging literatures in this field. There seems 
considerable scope fruitfully to move attention away from such exclusive concern with relatively narrow 
dynamics specific to a focal regime configuration - involving specific (but variously-construed) categories like 
‘regimes’,  ‘landscapes’  'niches’,  ‘incumbents’  and  ‘challengers’.  What  seems  to  come  more  to  the  fore  in  this  
case, are more general and pervasive qualities in wider political structures, discourses and processes. 
Seemingly especially important, is a rich body of recent discussion concerning diverse qualities of democracy – 
which (despite many differences of framing) is unanimous in characterising Germany more positively than the 
UK. Given associated levels of secrecy, it is relatively difficult to ascertain the importance of the additional 
stark contrast in nuclear military strategies in Germany and the UK. This is currently the focus of some parallel 
research by the present authors. But in the event this were a significant driver in its own right, the fact that 
military nuclear commitments remain virtually unmentioned in British policy documentation concerning 
rationales for supporting nuclear power, such secrecy would anyhow compound similar implications for 
democracy. In other words, in that such poor transparency would support a hypothesis positing a wider lack of 
democratic accountability.  
Whatever the precise drivers, then, it seems quite compelling in at least this specific case, that this particular – 
especially prominent – sociotechnical discontinuity is rather poorly understood by reference to the 
circumscribed concepts highlighted in conventional narrow versions of transitions theory. What is evidently 
more important here, are wider political factors relating broadly to general 'qualities of democracy'. Perhaps 
then, democracy is itself – in all its diverse, multidimensional and contested forms – a relatively neglected 
factor in the achieving of transformative sociotechnical change? Of course, this raises many counter-questions, 
precluding any unequivocal conclusion even in this case. But there do at least seem important implications for 
further research. 
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CONCEPTUAL AND EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND  
Introduction 
This paper is based around a simple yet under-explored query in relation to research on Sustainability 
Transitions (ST) and socio-technical change: why are radically different pathways to sustainability undertaken 
by different countries that are fairly similar in terms of their profiles regarding development, wealth, size and 
existing portfolio of energy provision? The paper explores this question by examining perhaps the most starkly 
differing examples of ‘sustainable’ energy policies in the ‘developed’ world: Germany and the UK. Germany has 
set in motion a complex shift towards a decentralised low carbon energy system through phasing out nuclear 
power by 2022 following the Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011 (World Nuclear News, 2011). From the 
perspective of some European governments and energy policy stakeholders, this is highly controversial. It is 
also at this stage simply a policy commitment, rather than a realised end. But it is precisely in this role as a 
firmly committed strategy, that the contrast is pronounced with the contrasting commitment in the UK, 
concerning equally as-yet-unrealised plans to undertake a low carbon energy transition involving the most 
ambitious nuclear new build programme in Europe (DECC, 2011). In both Germany and the UK, radical 
emissions reductions constitute a key factor justifying the contrasting transitions. The difference in 
motivations generating these general commitments cannot therefore simply be explained in terms of differing 
intensities in policy interests favouring a low carbon economy. Rather, these two countries highlight the 
diverse, ambiguous, contested and dynamic nature of pathways to sustainability (Leach, Scoones, & Stirling, 
2010).  
In these terms, these two contrasting case studies may provide fertile ground for building understandings 
concerning the factors that generate divergent trajectories in socio-technical transitions – of a kind that 
transcend singular notions of ‘low   carbon   transitions’.   It is only a relatively recent development in the 
sustainability transitions literature, that serious efforts have been made to build understandings of why such 
divergences exist between differing national contexts (Coenen et al, 2012). And, as is discussed in more detail 
below, the understanding of factors bearing upon different trajectories in relation specifically to civil nuclear 
power, remain a relatively understudied aspect of sustainability transitions research in general. This case study 
of the contrasting nuclear trajectories of Germany and the UK aims to contribute to both these agendas. 
 
The Richness and Diversity of 'Regime Theory' 
In assessing the differences between the cases of Germany and the UK this paper builds on burgeoning work 
related to ‘sustainability transitions’ (Markard, Raven, & Truffer, 2012) and what might broadly be understood 
as socio-technical regime theory (Geels, 2004).  Central to such approaches is the idea that technological 
change entails co-evolutionary interactions between technological artefacts, institutions, and agents. Over 
time, new   and   innovative   ‘niche’   technologies diffuse, transform and stabilise at ‘the regime level’ (Kemp, 
Schot, & Hoogma, 1998) In so doing, new regimes arise, with differing sets of artefacts, rules and regulations 
becoming apparent (Smith, 2007).  
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The idea of a technological regime was developed by Nelson & Winter (1982), conceptualising the dominant 
engineering  factors  that  guide  technologies  along  particular  ‘trajectories’. These ideas were further developed 
by Dosi (1982), whose work on technological paradigms explored how impacts on contrasting directions of 
innovation and associated patterns of continuous and discontinuous change are shaped by the interplay 
between scientific advances, institutional variables, economics and technology. Focusing strongly on 
sustainability challenges, recent studies of technological trajectories have been further developed to build 
more detailed understandings of how markets, socio-technical, scientific, and cognitive aspects interact in 
technological change (Geels & Schot, 2004; Kemp et al., 1998). As part of this broader body of study, the Multi-
Level Perspective (MLP) has been an especially dominant approach (Geels, Hekkert, & Jacobsson, 2008; Geels, 
2002, 2006; Jørgensen, 2012; Markard & Truffer, 2008). Beginning with a particular instrumental focus on 
policy strategies for ‘Strategic-Niche Management’ (SNM), ‘niche’  technologies have been identified as a focal 
point of entry – often understood as the key driver behind socio-technical transitions (Berkhout, Smith, & 
Stirling, 2004; Kemp et al., 1998; Schot & Geels, 2008; Witkamp, Raven, & Royakkers, 2011). Successful niche 
technologies  may   acquire  momentum   and   eventually   grow   to   such   a   scale   that   they   constitute   ‘challenger  
innovations’ (Strunz, 2014) contesting the dominant position of whatever in this context is held to be the 
‘incumbent’  sociotechnical  regime (Grin, Rotmans, & Schot, 2010).  
Socio-technical change is thus seen as usually occurring incrementally over a period of decades, as   ‘niche’  
technologies struggle to develop because they do not ‘fit’  with the dominant technological regimes already 
established (Berkhout et al., 2004). Due to a range of factors including economics, guiding principles, industrial 
structures, user relations and markets, policy and regulations, regimes are conceptualised as entailing semi-
coherent and mutually stabilising sets of rules and material constraints that make it  challenging  for  new  ‘niche’  
entrants to emerge, as they do not conform to dominant technological regimes (or are even seen as 
potentially destabilising threats by associated incumbent actors) (Nill & Kemp, 2009). However, it has been 
noted for some time, that there has perhaps been too  much  attention  on   ‘niches’   as   the   central   drivers  of  
socio-technical transitions (Raven, 2005; Smith, Stirling, & Berkhout, 2005), and not enough focus on 
‘interactions’  between  niches  and  regimes  for  example (Witkamp et al., 2011), where further explorations of 
processes  of   ‘lock   in’   (Unruh, 2000),   ‘path-dependency’   (Arthur, 1994; Pierson, 2000),   ‘endogenous  renewal’  
(Berkhout et al., 2004; Geels & Schot, 2007),  ‘entrapment’  (Walker, 2000) and  ‘obduracy’  (Hommels, 2005) are 
required to understand the regime level. 
Recent attention in the sustainability transitions community has turned towards questioning how dominant 
regimes maintain stability against   ‘challenges’   from   the   niche   level. This turn has been motivated partly in 
response to the experiences of the practical application of the ‘transition  management’  (TM) approach in the 
Netherlands, where sustainable technological niches did not develop in the widely-desired way, but faced 
significant   challenges   from   incumbent   actors   ‘capturing’   and   ‘resisting’   change. Here, the key formative 
processes appeared to be dominated by wider political dynamics of various kinds (Hendriks & Grin, 2007; 
Kemp, Rotmans, & Loorbach, 2007; Kern & Smith, 2008; Verbong & Geels, 2007). Such resistance by 
incumbent actors within unsustainable regimes is argued to compound increasing urgency surrounding climate 
change (and perceived policy failures in other responses), such as to further reinforce a dissatisfaction with 
incremental understandings of socio-technical transitions, prompting instead attention to more   ‘radical’  
transitions enacted over shorter time frames (Markard et al., 2012; Nill & Kemp, 2009; Smith, Voß, & Grin, 
2010). Incremental development of niches is increasingly thought of as an unreliable way to bring about the 
necessary rapid change, without corresponding efforts   targeted   directly   at   ‘undoing’   and   ‘destabilising’   the  
incumbent regimes themselves (Geels, 2014; Turnheim & Geels, 2012). So, recent work has highlighted the 
importance of dedicated governance interventions not only to support growing niches and challenger 
technologies, but also deliberately to discontinue (Bergek, Berggren, Magnusson, & Hobday, 2013; Stegmaier 
& Kuhlmann, 2013) incumbent unsustainable technological trajectories (Geels, 2014). 
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This paper takes this rich body of what we will call ‘regime theory’ as a starting point from which to seek to 
build a specific understanding of why the intended discontinuation of nuclear power for electricity production 
is taking place in Germany, whilst continuation and renewed nuclear enthusiasm are evident in the UK 
following Fukushima. Whilst taking the ‘focal  regime  configuration’  around nuclear power as the primary point 
of enquiry, the present comparative case study, also seeks to speak directly to wider themes in the field of 
‘sustainability transitions’ as addressed by the MLP. The MLP is of key relevance here, because its central aims 
are so strongly identified with this interest – in seeking to influence “…the  possibilities   for inducing a regime 
shift  in  energy  technology  away  from  fossil  fuels” (Rip and Kemp, 1998); explaining how “…technical  change  is  
locked into dominant technological regimes”  (Kemp et al, 1998: 175), and answering the  question  of  “...how  
we   can   understand   inertia,   and   how   it   is   overcome”   (Geels,   2002:   1258).   The   German   Energiewende is 
arguably the most pertinent example of a currently occurring politically deliberate ‘regime  shift’. So, the extent 
to which the MLP might be judged to provide requisite explanation or understanding of this case, remains a 
matter of considerable relevance and legitimate interest.  
However, the MLP is not the only relevant body of theory bearing on these phenomena. Indeed, this focus as a 
starting point on   ‘regime   dynamics’   departs in some ways from much earlier comparative analysis of the 
respective energy systems of the UK and Germany.  These variously draw on frameworks and methods from 
political economy, innovation and science and technology studies and critical policy analysis. Given their 
purpose, many earlier studies justifiably take renewables policy as the primary focus of analysis, with 
contrasting German and British nuclear decisions constituting an exogenous factor in building longitudinal 
understanding of renewable energy policy developments. Such studies are generally not concerned with close 
inspection of the regime dynamics around the nuclear industries of the UK and Germany in their own right 
(Bailey, 2007; Kleiner, 2008; Klessmann, Nabe, & Burges, 2008; Lipp, 2007; Lockwood, 2014a; Lovinfosse, 2008; 
Mitchell, Bauknecht, & Connor, 2006). Yet in previous literatures, nuclear technology has been highlighted as a 
paradigmatic example of processes driving regime stability – providing canonical examples of constitutive 
processes of ‘autonomy’   (Winner   1979),   ‘lock   in’   (Cowan, 1990) and   ‘entrapment’   (Walker, 2000). Taking 
account of this, other literatures have recognised the role played by nuclear power as a dominant force in 
shaping wider energy regimes (Elliott, 2006). But again, the particular dynamics that mediate such effects in 
the UK and Germany have only rarely been a focus of comparative attention.  
 
The Present ‘Abductive’ Approach 
This paper seeks to help remedy this relative lack of recent direct attention to the key elements that constitute 
nuclear regimes. It does this by focusing commensurate consideration on key characteristics both of the focal 
incumbent nuclear regimes in each country and on what are widely recognised as the principal ‘challenger’  
technologies (Ansari & Krop, 2012). In the case of the present  contrast  between  the  UK  ‘nuclear  renaissance’  
and the German renewables-based Energiewende (both aimed at low carbon transitions), the most relevant 
supply side challengers in both contexts are renewable energy technologies. But – as will be elaborated later – 
this immediately raises a question. The complex dynamics under scrutiny are crucially set within wider 
contrastingly-defined sociotechnical regimes concerned with energy production and electricity generation. 
And sociotechnical systems associated with both nuclear and other energy technologies may also be 
subdivided into notionally more circumscribed, contiguous, overlapping or partly-nesting ‘regimes’. Likewise, 
the  constituting  and  bounding  of  what  counts  as  a  relevant  ‘niche’,  or  ‘challenger’  will  also  be  ambiguous  and  
contestable. For this reason, the assemblage of interacting sociotechnical phenomena at the centre of 
attention here, will not take for granted the salience of a single self-evident ‘regime’. More will be said on 
these conceptual issues below. But for now, the point is that the present effort to help understand conditions 
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for continuity or disruption, will be directed not at notionally definitive categories, but at the relationships 
between them – referred  to  as  a  ‘focal  regime  configuration’. 
This focus still allows due account to be taken of key insights in the broad body of  ‘regime  theory’  bearing  on  
this topic of large scale sociotechnical change. Based on central insights in these literatures, the paper 
interrogates this focal regime configuration with a broad range of nine criteria constituted by 30 parameters 
addressing (as will be shown) factors variously implicated in these literatures. Together, these criteria 
articulate operational indicators for a wide range of what are variously held to be salient technical, economic, 
social, and political aspects. As such, the resulting explicit and systematic framework is intended to encompass 
a broad diversity of perspectives on regime dynamics in sustainability transitions, rather than a single 
theoretical framework. It equally encompasses general theories concerning the orienting of directionality in 
technological trajectories, as well as studies focussed on implications of attributed economic, technical, and 
political features of nuclear power and renewable energies more particularly (Hultman, 2011; Jewell, 2011; 
Linares & Conchado, 2013; MacKerron, 2004; Sovacool & Valentine, 2012; Verbruggen, Laes, & Lemmens, 
2014). It is because of the resulting lack of dependence on a particular deductively explanatory framework or a 
definitively testable inductive theory, that the present approach might be considered to be more ‘abductive’ in 
style (Peng & Reggia, 1990; Josephson & Josephson, 1996; Aliseda, 2006; Magnani, 2009). In other words, as a 
systematic abductive exercise, this study is an effort to explore a potential novel hypothesis in the context of 
alternatives and inform a general understanding of its salience, rather than definitively test or assert this. 
Taking each criterion in turn, provisional observations are made individually and transparently on a çeteris 
paribus basis concerning the most likely hypothetical respective ‘directions of  travel’ of the ‘nuclear  regime'  in 
Germany and the UK with respect to the picture yielded under that criterion.  Here, a distinction is helpful 
between criteria that relate most strongly to dynamics   that  are   ‘internal'   to  the ‘focal   regime  configuration’  
around nuclear power (and its associated constituting and directly challenging structures), and those that 
implicate  wider  and  more  pervasive  'external’  social  and  political factors. ‘Internal’ factors thus include those 
processes most strongly explored by conventional regime theory, concerning relations within variously-
definable ‘regimes’ within or encompassing nuclear power itself and its supply chains (including the wider 
electricity generating industry). Factors internal to this conventional focus of attention also include more 
agonistic relations directly and immediately mediated by sectoral market, industrial and policy processes, with 
emergent niches and potential ‘challenger   regimes’   around   renewable   and other candidate strategies for 
sustainable electricity production.  
These  ‘internal  dynamics’  contrast  with  factors that might be understood to be ‘external’ to this focal regime 
configuration, like general political culture, elite policy discourse, patterns of public opinion and wider 
attributes of democratic governance. Some of these factors are not specific to the particular context of the 
nuclear power regime within its sectoral setting in electricity supply, but are instead more generally pervasive 
through each national political environment taken as a whole. This distinction can also be found in analysis of 
‘regimes’  in  approaches  such  as  the  MLP. Geels and Schot (2007) for example, differentiate between ‘regime 
insider’ dynamics   and   ‘external   pressures’   caused   by   ‘outsiders’   such   as   societal   pressure   groups,   social  
movements,  “outsider  professional  scientists”  and  “outsider  firms,  entrepreneurs,  or  activists”.   In one sense, 
these external factors might be held to relate to what is often characterised  as  ‘the  landscape’  in  conventional  
regime theory (Baker, Newell, & Phillips, 2014). But   they  are  not   just  about   ‘high   level’,   ‘long  run’  processes  
overarching regime developments (Hess & Mai, 2014). They are broader in scope, but also include many fine-
grain details of social and political culture that deeply pervade very particular constitutive features equally of 
regimes and niches.  
In this sense, some of what   are   referred   to  here  as   ‘external’   factors   are   increasingly  well   addressed   in   the 
recent ‘political  turn’  in  sustainability  transitions studies (Coenen, Benneworth, & Truffer, 2012; Geels, 2014; 
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Kern, 2012; Lockwood, 2014b; Meadowcroft, 2009; Normann, 2014). This involves attention extending away 
from narrower policy aspects alone, to also encompass wider political dimensions of regime dynamics and the 
actions of incumbents and new entrants (Baker, Newell, &Phillips, 2014; Geels, 2014; Hess, 2014; 
Meadowcroft, 2009; Smink, Hekkert, & Negro, 2013; Stirling, 2014a).  
But, in crucial respects, the scope of the present attention to ‘external’   political implications goes beyond 
much of this discussion. It highlights the potential relevance of very general and pervasive constituting 
features of political environments, that are not necessarily best viewed hierarchically as overarching levels, but 
perhaps rather in more horizontal ways, as fabrics that constitute even the most specific loci in implicated 
regimes or niches (Stirling, forthcoming). An example here concerns multidimensional consideration of the 
general qualities of democracy in each respective national setting (criterion nine).  And  ''external’ criteria also 
include quite specific factors that are beyond the immediate environment of the focal regime configuration 
around nuclear power, but which are nonetheless perhaps best understood as parallel characteristics in other 
sociotechnical regimes rather than overarching  ‘higher  level’  environments.  An  example  here  concerns  military  
dispositions in each national case – and the depth of strategic commitment to capabilities for delivering 
weapons of mass destruction (criterion six).  
Although not central  to  conventional  ‘regime  theory’ in its present forms, the potential relevance of including 
attention   to   these   ‘external’   factors   in   this   case,   is  highlighted  more   in  older   literatures  on   the  political  and  
industrial circumstances of nuclear power. Anteceding the development of contemporary regime theories, this 
work goes back   to   Ellul,   Oppenheimer,   Russell   and   Eisenhower’s   ‘military   industrial   complex’   in   the   1950’s   
(Camilleri, 1984). Here can be found intense discussion bearing on the particular relevance of and for nuclear 
technologies, of general considerations of democracy. For Lovins (1977) nuclear represented a “hard”, 
centralised energy path which in part due to proliferation potential had profound effects on the very fabric of 
society in terms of authoritarian forms of governance.  Bookchin (1996) argued very explicitly that the 
extension of democracy through decentralisation of power was prevented by the continuation of nuclear.   
Such themes were also highlighted by Patterson (1977) who  in  a  description  of  the  ‘fissile  society’  outlines  the  
ways that the specialist knowledge and historical military emergence creates an under-scrutinised technical 
elite   to  which  politicians   ‘bow’  to  without  proper deliberation on differing technological trajectories that do 
not   include   nuclear,   later   addressing   the   secretive   nature   of   the   ‘plutonium   business’   (Patterson,   1984).  
Langdon  Winner  also  used  nuclear  to  interrogate  the  ‘politics  of  artefacts’  arguing that there is a risk  of the 
‘mentalities’  and  ‘social  structures’  associated  with  nuclear  ‘spilling  over’  into  society  as  a  whole, with negative 
effects on democracy (Winner, 1980). Indeed, discussions of ‘democratic   deficits’   within nuclear decision-
making was previously a major theme of academic enquiry in many disciplines (Blowers & Pepper, 1987; 
Massey, 1988; Schrader-Frechette, 1980; B Wynne, 1982). This comes together with issues around the nuclear 
power industry itself, the huge military implications of national nuclear technological capabilities both in the 
production of fission and fusion weapons and propulsion for high performance submarine platforms for their 
effective strategic delivery. These links have long been strongly disavowed – even ridiculed – in much industry 
documentation and associated policy analysis. A unique international regulatory regime has been developed in 
order to assure effective separation. But – irrespective of the answers – the resulting persistent questions 
raised by critics concerning secrecy and covert drivers in policy making, do also bring together issues of the 
military salience of nuclear power with  issues around the qualities of democracy. 
In order to address (rather crudely) this issue of   general   contextual   ‘qualities   of   democracy’, the 'external' 
criteria developed for this paper will focus on a recently-emerging dedicated literature on exactly this theme 
(Bühlmann, Merkel, & Müller, 2011; Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010; Hess & Mai, 2014; Lijphart, 2012; 
Munck, 2014). Although well addressed in the earlier literatures sketched above, these issues are relatively 
neglected in conventional regime theory. Indeed, some emerging concerns coming out of the Dutch transitions 
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experience have involved recognition that the TM approach reveals potential democratic tensions over who 
decides the course a particular transitions pathway takes, and the means through which such decisions are 
reached (Hendriks & Grin, 2007; Hendriks, 2009; Shove & Walker, 2007). In putting forward a countervailing 
case for the democratic potential of TM, Jhagroe & Loorbach (2014) confirm a gap in the literature focussed on 
democratic issues in the field of sustainable transitions. And outside  the  ‘transitions  management’  field,  recent  
important work by Hess & Mai (2014), uses data on democratic ratings of countries from the Economist 
Intelligence to draw attention to the overlooked factor of democracy in determining differing directions in 
sustainable   energy   policy   in   South   East   Asia.   So   the   present   focus   on   ‘qualities   of   democracy’   as   ‘external  
factors’  not only chimes and builds on this recent work, but offers a way systematically to test in a particular 
case, some of the key implications.  
 
Some Conceptual Issues  
In addressing these complex issues, some care is necessary at the outset to avoid an impression of 
insufficiently nuanced or discriminating usage of terminology – for instance around concepts like   ‘regime’  or  
‘democracy’. On the latter, it should be especially emphasised, that it is not the purpose of this paper to seek 
to draw conclusions concerning the relative ‘levels’, circumstances or overall status  of  ‘democracy’  in  Germany  
and the UK (whatever this may mean). Indeed, the paper will conclude by stressing the need for more dynamic 
interpretations of democracy as processual and relational (rather than categorical) and as situated and scale-
independent (rather than synoptically-structured and context-free) (Stirling, 2014b; forthcoming).  
A similar point might also usefully be made with respect to other concepts used above in setting the scene for 
this study – like those developed in what is termed sociotechnical ‘regime  theory’ (Rip and Kemp, 1998;. Geels, 
2002; Smith & Raven 2012]. Here, the most important point distinguishing this study from much of the 
literature surveyed above, is that it seeks to avoid simply reproducing the form of elaborate prior – deductive-
style – theoretical frameworks (like those concerning the ostensibly individually discrete and collectively 
complete   ‘levels’  of   regime   theory). Regime theory has been used as a deep and rich basis of thought from 
which to formulate criteria for deductive-style reasoning and inductive-style hypothesising of contending 
candidates as drivers of sociotechnical discontinuity. But the findings that this will yield will very deliberately in 
this study, not be explicitly framed in advance in terms of the well-established categories like ‘niches’, 
‘regimes’,   ‘landscapes’,   ‘phases’,   ‘incumbents’  or   ‘challengers’.   Instead – as has been mentioned – this study 
focuses on the less fine-grain relational concept of a ‘focal   regime  configuration’.  This  addresses  what   is   for  
our purposes, the most important locus for salient dynamics and relations operating between this 
constellation of analytical categories. But it does this in a fashion that acknowledges that the resulting picture 
is   structured   by   ‘polar’   co-ordinates around the subjective focus of the observer, rather than implying an 
objectively   complete   ‘Cartesian'   framework   of   ubiquitous   ‘levels’   or   assuming   that   the   boundaries and 
mechanics of implicated entities and drivers have been precisely determined (Stirling, forthcoming).  
Beyond the practical issues already discussed, the general conceptual reasons for this, centre on the under-
determined, relational and multidimensional nature of the social dynamics in this field. This arguably in any 
case means concepts  of  ‘niches’,  ‘regimes’,  ‘landscapes’,  ‘phases’,  ‘incumbents’  or  ‘challengers’  (like associated 
broader social theoretic categories: actors, structures, relations and processes) are better addressed not with a 
“monothetic glance”, but  each  as  a  “polythetic flux”   (Ritzer, 2000). In simple terms, the ostensibly definitive 
analytical categories used in this kind of theory are not actually self-evident, but to a significant extent in the 
eye of the beholder. Crucially, the problem here is the categories themselves and their idealised relations, not 
just the empirical instances. And if categories themselves are not necessarily definable in the kinds of clear-cut 
ways suggested in their assertive usage (Borgatta & Montgomery, 2000; Schutz, 1967), then the implications 
are profound for understanding and action.  
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So, with respect more specifically to the present case, it is often far more ambiguous than is typically conceded 
which instances of real-world phenomena relate to which particular analytical categories   (like   ‘levels’   or  
‘phases’)  and  what  the   implications  might  be.   For   instance,  what  exactly   is  a   'regime’   in  this  context (Shove, 
2012): a particular nuclear design complex (Cowan, 1990); nuclear power as a whole (Berkhout, 1997); the 
national electricity generating system in which these are embedded (Strunz, 2014); wider international 
infrastructures and supply chains associated with electricity supply in general (Malerba, 2002) or the entire 
technological and institutional environment of energy provision within which it is  seamlessly entangled  
(Hughes, 1989). Likewise, the most formative processes and relations behind incumbency or discontinuity may 
in  principle  be  more  due  to  ‘horizontal’  relations  linking  continguous  or  overlapping regimes – within  a  ‘level’  
rather than between them. And broader political theory also suggests balanced attention be given to 
processes and power gradients that transcend any particular picture of relevant sociotechnical regimes, but 
which are nonetheless   less   comprehensively   expansive   than   ‘the   landscape’.   These   are   the   reasons   for  
introducing  the  analytical  device  of  the  ‘focal  regime  configuration’  in  order  to  recognise  that  what counts as 
any one regime may be expected to be radically polythetic and ambiguous and only poorly captured in an 
ontology  of  three  nested  ‘levels’ (Coenen et al, 2012).  
This is important, because there is in this field as elsewhere in social science, a typically much stronger 
reflexive relationship than is declared, between representations of the supposedly objective phenomena 
under scrutiny and the subjective circumstances of analysis (Žižek,  2006). Assertion of analytical schemes using 
these kinds of category may often be much less precise than they purport – saying more about the disciplinary 
and policy imperatives bearing on the system of research, than the phenomenological dynamics of the systems 
under research. As a result, all such formally codified category schemes may offer a good basis for building a 
research community, at the same time as seriously under-characterising the totality of salient relations in the 
real world with respect to which that community is ostensibly defined. Pressures for policy justification, 
discipline-creation and identity-forming can foster more serious vulnerabilities than are admitted, to unduly 
reductive simplification and hubris – and associated uncertainty, ambiguity, indeterminacy and surprise. The 
fact that a reified single  notional   ‘eagle eye’  view  of   ‘the  regime’   is   very  useful for the purpose of justifying 
intended high level policy making, is not of itself necessarily sufficient to warrant its acceptance as a 
satisfactory framework for describing the phenomena themselves,  especially  in  the  ‘toad  eye’  view  of  typical  
rea-world practice (Allouche, Middleton, & Gyawali, 2014). 
Of course, as a general issue in academic enquiry, this latter point would bear as strongly on the current 
analytical framework as those to which it owes a debt. It is for this reason that the present study attempts a 
more abductive approach as described above, with respect to a range of specifically-defined criteria grounded 
in other literatures, rather than an elaborate array of finely disaggregated but under-defined categories and 
mechanisms. It is also for this reason, that the empirical argument forming the main part of the paper, is 
substantiated wherever possible by reference to independently verifiable statistics (with all their 
imperfections), rather than just the narrative interpretations of the authors. The categories used in defining 
these parameters are relatively independent from those used to develop resulting understandings. So the 
evidence deployed here remains socially-constructed and contestable. But the absence of such a close circular 
relationship between constituting assumptions and concluding interpretations at least offers some measure of 
accountability for the argument as a whole.   
One possible reaction to this, concerns the apparent exception of the treatment of the concept of democracy 
introduced in the last section. As observed above, the analytically problematic nature of this term combines 
with its normative loading to present particular difficulties. These will be returned to in light of the empirical 
discussion at the end of this paper. But for the moment, the use of the concept itself can be justified (in 
keeping with the abductive style of this analysis) as a heuristic for addressing a relational process, rather than 
a fixed framework for addressing a static category. In other work in this vein, democracy has been 
characterised as a continual open-ended process of struggle by the least powerful to the capabilities for 
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challenging power (Stirling, 2014) Drawing on a wide literature (Bourdieu, 1998; Gramsci, 1971; Luhmann, 
1995; Lukes, 2005; Sen, 2000; Simon, 1991; VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002), this addresses 'power’  in  all  its  diverse  
and multidimensional forms as ‘asymmetrically  structuring agency’  (Stirling, 2014b). So, the use of the concept 
of democracy here does not invoke a singular apparently straightforward category. Instead, it implicates the 
broad character of encompassing and constituting power relations, again allowing a more abductive, situated 
and relational understanding of what   ‘qualities of democracy’   might   mean   in   any   given   setting.   And this 
characterising of democracy In terms of multiple polythetic relational qualities, rather than single notionally 
unambiguous category helps avoid the dangers criticised above in relation to key concepts in conventional 
regime theory. In setting the scene for this study, it can at least be argued that the concepts employed in the 
framing of this enquiry aim neither at an axiomatic deductive structure nor a definitive inductive test for a 
particular causal explanation. What is aimed at instead is an abductive contribution to understanding – 
involving a robust exploration of the context, meanings and implications of one particular hypothesis in the 
context of possible alternatives. Further elaboration of what this might mean, is best left until the findings 
have been presented.  
 
Case Study Background: Nuclear Power in the UK and Germany  
Civilian nuclear power finds itself at a pivotal juncture. The technology could provide a source of low carbon 
energy and has been compared in various life cycle analyses to wind and solar power in terms of the amount 
of carbon emitted during mining, construction, and electricity production (Fthenakis & Kim, 2007; IPCC, 2012; 
Lenzen, 2008; Sims, Rogner, & Gregory, 2003). Although there are critical assessments of such conclusions 
(Barnham, 2015; Sovacool, 2008), what remains undisputed is the emissions produced through the life-cycle of 
nuclear power are substantially lower than those produced from comparable fossil-fuel   ‘base-load’  
technologies such as large coal-fired power plants and gas-fired power stations (Kleiner, 2008). 
However, predictions of   an   impending   ‘nuclear renaissance’ (Nuttall, 2004) routinely espoused by industry 
(Nuclear Industry Association, 2013)  and governmental policy (DECC, 2013)  remain far from certain. 
Scepticism regarding the apparent imminent nuclear renaissance is justifiable not only due to the various 
governmental phase-outs and cancellations occurring after the accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear 
power plant In March 2011 (Ramana, 2013), but also by rigorous analysis that simply points out the gap 
between the rhetoric of nuclear advocacy compared with the actualities of new build programmes – a result of 
various economic and political impediments, not to mention the presence of concrete policy alternatives 
which further complicate any notion that a ‘renaissance’   is inevitable (Bradford, 2012; Schneider & Froggatt, 
2014; Thomas, 2012).  
Nuclear policy continues to be infused with a plethora of political challenges, controversies, and uncertainties. 
These include unresolved issues surrounding waste disposal, on-going risks related to proliferation of nuclear 
weapons,   recent   accidents,   ‘negative   learning   experiences’   in   terms  of   increasing   costs  over   time,   long   lead  
times for construction, public concern and protest, to name a few (Hultman, 2011). For these reasons nuclear 
remains   one   of   the   most   “iconoclastically   controversial”   of   modern   technologies   (Wynne, 2010: 1). The 
multitude of issues highlights the important point that nuclear remains a   ‘political   choice’   rather   than   a 
‘scientific   necessity’ - the latter being a status often afforded to nuclear by certain contemporary analysis 
(King, 2005; Lynas, 2013).  
This recognition of nuclear as a ‘political choice’,   relates   precisely   to   the case study focus of this paper. 
Arguably the comparison between the respective responses of Germany and the UK in response to the 
Fukushima accident in Japan in March 2011 illuminates most clearly the political dimension of nuclear policy 
and sustainable transitions more generally. Germany with its pre-Fukushima nuclear portfolio of 17 reactors 
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producing a quarter of electricity, made the decision to phase-out nuclear completely by 2022, with the 
immediate closure of 8 reactors (World Nuclear Association, 2015a). The UK with its nuclear portfolio 
comprised of 16 reactors producing 18% of total electricity, reaffirmed its pre-Fukushima commitment to 
construct around 16GW of new nuclear power by 2030, with potential for a total of 19GW after that (ibid).   
Much has been written regarding the range of potential implications and challenges concerning the German 
Energiewende (Bruninx,   Madzharov,   Delarue,   &   D’haeseleer,   2013;   Griffin, Buisson, Criqui, & Mima, 2013; 
Huenteler, Schmidt, & Kanie, 2012; Smith Stegen & Seel, 2013). Similarly,   the  UK’s   nuclear policy has been 
scrutinized mainly in terms of the potential difficulties that aiming to construct 16GW of nuclear power in a 
liberalised energy market presents (Harris, Heptonstall, Gross, & Handley, 2013; Linares & Conchado, 2013). 
What has not been focussed on to the same extent, is an inspection of the factors that influence the differing 
direction of travel of the respective socio-technical regimes of the UK and Germany with respect to nuclear 
power. This is the area this paper contributes towards. This paper speaks to literature that is focussed on 
understanding the dynamics of ‘innovation  journeys’  (Geels & Verhees, 2011; Geels et al., 2008; Schot & Geels, 
2008; Verbong, Geels, & Raven, 2008), and why certain technological trajectories evolve in the way they do. 
The comparison between the UK and Germany is also of importance in terms of understanding energy policy 
more generally. As Ramana (2013:73) observes,   “The   Fukushima   crisis,   unfortunate   as   it   is,   offers   a   rare  
opportunity  to  observe  the  shifts  in  nuclear  policies  of  multiple  countries  in  response  to  a  common  event”. It is 
also identified that this remains an understudied line of enquiry. Researchers have shown great interest in why 
some countries choose to pursue nuclear weapons or not, however not much work has been done on civilian 
nuclear power, the literature remaining ‘sparse’   (ibid:   73).  This paper contributes directly to this gap in the 
literature. 
Jewell (2011) focusses on the pressures   acting   in   the   ‘developing world’, with some previously non-nuclear  
countries also deciding to pursue nuclear strategies based around a study of attributes of countries originally 
adopting nuclear power, and the capacities that are required for such a path to be feasible. This outlines 
wealth, large economy,  political  stability,  ‘effective’  government,   large electricity grid, security of fuel supply, 
and international grid connections as being determinate in whether countries are likely to have the capacity to 
adopt.  This analysis however, focuses on decision-making prior to any nuclear programme being present in 
the country rather than an understanding of what policies have recently emerged in countries with long 
established nuclear programmes, and does not focus in more detail on aspects of politics, governance and 
technological alternatives. Sovacool and Valentine (2012) focus on a varied set of socio-technical dimensions 
which contribute to the evolution and maintenance of nuclear power programmes. They identify (amongst 
other things),   ‘centralised’   governance   structures   as   being a necessary factor for a large nuclear power 
programme. More specifically related to the case studies under consideration in this paper, the divergent 
European responses to Fukushima  and  the  political  factors  giving  rise  to  Germany’s  closure have been studied  
(Jahn & Korolczuk, 2012; Winter, 2013; Wittneben, 2012).  
However, these papers tend to look at the political conditions relating to the short time span following 
Fukushima such as the local elections which were a main influence on the decision-making of the Merkel 
Government, or aspects such as protest movements, and whilst such conditions are clearly important to an 
analysis of the policy responses to Fukushima, this paper seeks to cover a broader range and time frame than 
done so by work so far. However the present paper seeks to explore the wider and more long-term dynamics 
that enabled such responses to occur, in order to build towards an understanding of the divergences between 
the respective British and German nuclear policies. Exploring more long term processes of incumbent nuclear 
technology in the Germany and the UK requires further literature related to stability and change within socio-
technical regimes.  
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In seeking to address the questions defined above concerning nuclear power in particular and sustainability 
transitions literatures in general, the selection of Germany and the UK as two country-based case studies is not 
only warranted by the focal contrast in nuclear trajectories (Yin,  2003) The choice is also justified in relation to 
other variables under which these two contrasting contexts are relatively similar on a world stage – in relation, 
for instance, to rough parity of industrial development, broadly shared northern European political and 
institutional cultures, similarly established histories of nuclear engineering, jointly secure penetration of 
nuclear power in the generation mix – as well as the very general scales of population size, land area and 
economic output. The point of the focal comparison around the divergent currently-committed nuclear 
strategies, is not to imply that either case can be generalised to apply to radically divergent contexts 
elsewhere. The central challenge point is more to take the opportunity afforded by this fortuitous conjunction 
of similarities and differences, to explore in an abductive fashion, which kinds of factor might offer the most 
persuasive basis for understanding the observed contrasts. Among other features, the relatively abductive 
style of the analysis is underscored by the factors in question being quite intuitively applicable and constituted 
by reference to a range of relevant disciplinary perspectives, rather structured in advance by reference to a 
single theoretical framework for axiomatic deduction or inductive hypothesis testing (Peng & Reggia, 1990; 
Josephson & Josephson, 1996; Aliseda, 2006; Magnani, 2009). The fact that the two countries are each 
important equally in their own right and as arenas for global nuclear developments, together with the absence 
of previous similar comparative studies, also reinforce this particular research design.  
 
Factors Bearing on Nuclear Discontinuity in Germany and Continuity in the UK 
This section introduces the particular criteria utilised to interrogate the cases of the German and UK nuclear 
policies. It is developed both through a discussion of literature relating to key aspects  of  ‘innovation  journeys’   
and transitions (such as lock-in and path dependency), alongside general political economic considerations 
hinging on resource endowments and industrial capabilities as well as factors arising in literatures on nuclear 
power more specifically. Given the emphasis on the empirical case studies occupying most of this paper and 
the following discussion, the authors are aware that the brevity of the discussion in each section of key 
literature related to directions of innovation journeys does not do justice to the richness of this literature. 
However, the discussion as a whole remains long, so for reasons of space each section has to be kept relatively 
brief. Through the establishment of wide-ranging criteria related to nuclear power and innovation pathways, 
the key factors requiring further exploration related to how incumbents in arguably stronger positions in 
Germany are destabilised, whilst those in the UK in arguably more challenging circumstances maintain 
positions of power, are identified.  
A number of distinct concepts have been developed in order to understand the ways in which transformation 
is inhibited in socio-technical systems and incumbency is maintained.   These   include   ‘autonomy’   (Winner, 
1999) ,  ‘lock  in’  (Cowan, 1990),  ‘path  dependency’(Arthur, 1994),  ‘entrapment’  (Walker, 2000),  and  ‘obduracy’  
in  ‘socio-technical  imaginaries’  (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009).  More  recently,  notions  of  ‘incumbent  strategies’  have  
been developed, adopting  political-economic   perspectives   to   analyse   the   ‘resistance’   of   incumbents   to   the  
diffusion of alternative technologies (Geels, 2014; Smink et al., 2013). Similarly recent attention has turned 
towards understanding how such path dependent configurations can be ‘destabilised’   (Turnheim & Geels, 
2012), as well more recent attention to the active discontinuation of well-established socio-technical systems 
(Stegmaier & Kuhlmann, 2013). 
Lock-in and path-dependency are focussed on here to draw attention to economic, technological, and 
institutional dynamics which form barriers to transformation and sustain incumbent positions within socio-
technical systems. As Geels et al (2008: 522) illustrate, the lock in mechanisms which perpetuate incumbent 
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positions for existing technologies include periods  of  increasing  return’,  ‘learning  by  doing’,  ‘scale  economics’,  
favourable   regulations’,   ‘sunk   investments’   and   ‘vested   interests’. These   factors   can   contribute   to   the   ‘lock-
out’  of  alternative technologies (Delrio & Unruh, 2007), and from an economic perspective it follows that the 
greater the levels of industrial strength, sunk capital, Research and Development expenditure, stronger 
networks, and more economically efficient a certain sector is, the stronger the tendencies towards path-
dependency and lock-in (ibid).  
However, focussing on socio-technical regimes also draws attention to other crucial factors including struggles 
over  ‘framing’  of  a  particular  technological  artefact  taking place in the public domain (Geels & Verhees, 2011) 
which influence the direction of a particular innovation journey. Also crucial are ‘discursive   struggles’ in the 
policy domain (Kern, 2012),  and the role of social movements in influencing technological selection. This 
relates more to the political contestations taking place within innovation journeys (Meadowcroft, 2009), 
opening traditional evolutionary economic approaches up to a wider analysis involving a wider set of political 
and cultural factors. From the perspective of Science, Technology Studies (STS),  the cultural significance of the 
national political contexts in which technological development takes place has been explored using concepts 
of   ‘socio-technical   imaginaries’   (Jasanoff  and  Kim,  2009)  and   ‘civic  epistemologies’   (Miller, 2005). Identifying 
this as an understudied line of enquiry, these frameworks examine the relationship between scientific 
knowledge and political institutions including the state (Jasanoff & Kim, 2009). Understandings of socio-
technical imaginaries highlight how repeated patterns of decision-making and technological commitments 
remain entrenched beyond the levels of individual regimes, pervading the entire domain of public policy 
related to science and technology. 
In terms of examining features of nuclear power itself and assessing why particular countries make the 
decisions they do with regard to the technology, the main criterion cited in existing policy literatures have 
essentially been limited to climate change mitigation and energy security, energy demand issues, and public 
opinion (Sovacool & Valentine, 2012). It is fair to say that social science research on nuclear power has been 
slow to catch up in terms of the analysis of a range of broader issues outside of these three dimensions, and in 
particular, interrogation of factors relating to the political dynamics and vested interests that contribute to 
choices over nuclear energy remains sparse (Sovacool, 2011) . This stands in stark contrast to previous rounds 
of nuclear development where a range of political and democratic issues formed a focal point of analysis 
(Blowers & Pepper, 1987; Byrne & Hoffman, 1996; Camilleri, 1984; Eckstein, 1997; Kitschelt, 1986; Massey, 
1988;  O’Riordan,  1988;  Purdue,  Kemp,  &  O’Riordan, 1984; Schrader-Frechette, 1980).  
The criteria established to contrast the cases of the UK and Germany thus seek to encapsulate concerns 
relating to a broad range of factors including technical, economic, political and cultural domains. Verbruggen 
et al (2014) assessed what they referred to as the  ‘actual’  sustainability  of  nuclear  power  by developing a set 
of 19 criteria extending beyond the usual preoccupation with carbon alone. Their criteria are based around 
four categories including environmental/ecological, economics, social, and governance/ policy (politics). These 
include concerns such as the wider economic framework in which nuclear is proposed in consideration that 
nuclear struggles to operate in more liberalised energy markets (Kahn, 1997; MacKerron, 2004). Hultman 
(2011) identifies other key dimensions of nuclear technology which can be used as useful criteria including 
military-related nuclear activity and how competitive a country’s particular nuclear industry is in terms of 
general performance and economic efficiency.  
As   well   as   a   focus   on   the   incumbent   nuclear   industry,   certain   criterion   also   relate   to   the   ‘challenger’  
technologies   within   a   ‘focal   regime   configuration’. Some environmentalists advocate gas (with or without 
fracking) as a technology that might be utilised to reduce carbon emissions (Podesta and Wirth, 2009). 
However, such scenarios are strongly disputed elsewhere (Davis and Shearer, 2014). In any case, it is 
renewables that have persistently been identified as ‘the challenge’   to  centralised  nuclear  power and fossil-
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fuels in literatures specifically related to the focal phenomenon of the Energiwewende. Neither gas nor 
‘fracking’  are identified as having any long-term role in the Energiewende (Federal Ministry of Economics and 
Technology, 2012; Morris and Pehnt, 2012). Thus, renewables can confidently be identified as the key 
‘challenger’   technologies   in this context, with gas remaining for present purposes beyond the scope of 
analysis. The observed patterns in relation to nuclear and renewables apply in any event, irrespective of the 
wider dynamics around gas. Similarly,  energy  efficiency  could  be   identified  as  a   ‘challenger’  policy.  However  
whilst it is true that Germany has demonstrated greater progress towards implementing energy efficiency, this 
is   balanced   out   by   the   fact   that   the   UK   has   a   larger   unexploited   ‘resource’   in   terms   of   energy   efficiency  
measures, thus this factor is unlikely to be an important source of bias, unlike the variability in renewables. 
Differences between energy efficiency policies of Germany and the UK and how this may impact on 
technological choice, is an important area of future research however. 
So, each individual criterion developed here, represents a consideration which arises in respect of some 
literature or another as a factor that, all else being equal, might reasonably be expected to exert an important 
influence on the prospects for the discontinuation of nuclear trajectories and its substitution by alternative 
energy strategies. The resulting broad array of economic, technical, political, and social dimensions have been 
assembled from a mix of literatures related to socio-technical regimes as well as nuclear specific studies. Taken 
together, the group of criteria as a whole constitutes a set of considerations that might collectively be taken in 
any interdisciplinary understanding to assume a generally more significant explanatory value, than any other 
particular factors. The table below outlines the criteria, identifying  whether  they  are  ‘internal’  or  ‘external’,  the  
rationale for each, and a selection of relevant literature.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Criteria, associated parameters and selection rationale. 
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EMPIRICAL APPLICATION OF CRITERIA TO CASE STUDIES  
 
This section outlines empirical findings related to the set of criteria listed above. For each criterion it is 
proposed whether discontinuation would be more or less likely to take place in Germany or the UK at the end 
of each section. These propositions have their basis in literature on socio-technical change as well as nuclear 
specific literature as detailed above. It is assessed whether the factors present in Germany or the UK related to 
each criterion would be more or less likely to influence discontinuation in terms of how these factors are 
thought to impinge on the direction of socio-technical systems in the broad sets of literature identified. What 
was  found  to  be  the  case  was  that  criteria  that  related  to  the  ‘internal’  factors  of  a  focal  regime  configuration 
would be thought to produce the opposite direction of travel than has actually occurred – the UK initiating 
discontinuation   policies   and   Germany   continuing   with   nuclear   power.   Those   factors   ‘external’   to   the   focal  
regime configuration fit with the direction of travel thereby suggesting these factors have an overriding 
influence on discontinuation policies related to the focal regime configuration surrounding nuclear power. The 
table preceding this page (table 2) summarizes the findings from the empirical section before each criterion is 
discussed in detail.  
 
1:0 General Market Conditions in the Two Countries  
1:1 Market coordination 
Nuclear energy has traditionally relied on strong levels of coordination by the state and has struggled to be 
economically viable in liberalised energy markets (Thomas, 2010). The nuclear regime has depended on high 
levels of state intervention in markets and coordination by government. A  ‘varieties  of  capitalism’  analysis  (Hall  
and Soskice 2001) identifies paradigmatic differences in economic and market conditions in the UK and 
Germany. In this view, Germany is the main example of a ‘coordinated  economy’. This entails a strong role 
played by the state in intervening to steer markets towards desired ends. Indeed, proactive support of a 
variety of innovative energy technologies, suggests Germany as a possible example of an even more strongly 
defined   ‘entrepreneurial   state’   (Mazzucato, 2013). Germany contrasts with the UK, which a varieties of 
capitalism analysis holds to be (with the USA) a paradigmatic example of a ‘market  economy’.  In this case, the 
prevailing   trend   is   for   lesser   degrees  of   coordination   from   the   state,   allowing  private   investment   and   ‘price  
signals’   to  be  not   just   the  main   instruments   – but also key drivers –of policy.  The coordinated approach of 
Germany can be thought to be more in tune with the kinds of governance arrangements that favour nuclear 
power. 
1:2 General Public Spending 
Over the past 20 years, the  ‘coordinated’  nature  of  Germany’s  economy has seen significantly greater levels of 
general public spending as a proportion of GDP than is the case in the liberalised market economy of the UK. In 
2011, public expenditure accounted for 44% of German GDP, with the same figure for the UK at 39% (Cottarelli 
& Schaechter, 2010). In the year 2000, German public spending increased to 47% of GDP, with the 
corresponding figure for the UK reducing to 37% (ibid). This general picture is compounded by specific figures 
for energy R&D considered later in this article, but is in its own right potentially relevant to the general 
conditions for transformation.  
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Çeteris paribus proposition 
Given the upfront capital costs and history of strong state involvement and spending with regards to nuclear 
power, it could be  argued  that  Germany’s  higher   levels  of  public  spending  and  state   intervention  in  markets  
would favour the continuation of nuclear power and discontinuation would be more likely in the UK. 
 
2:0  Degree of penetration of nuclear in the electricity generating mix 
2.1: Top eleven nuclear generating countries 
In 2009, before Fukushima, Germany generated more than twice the amount of electricity from nuclear power 
than was produced in the UK (fig. 1) 
 
Figure1: Top 11 nuclear generating countries, 2009 (billions KWh) 
 
Source: IAEA (2010) 
 
The graph below shows in absolute terms that Germany produced significantly more electricity from nuclear 
power in 2013 than did the UK, ranking seventh in the world for total nuclear generation, compared with the 
UK positioned at ninth. This is despite having closed 8 reactors following events at Fukushima in 2011.  
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Figure2: Top ten nuclear generating countries, 2013 (billions kWh)  
 
Source: Nuclear Energy Institute (2014) 
2.2: Dependency on Nuclear power 
The picture is even more pronounced when considering the longer timeframes over which the divergent cases 
of the UK and Germany have developed. Table 3below outlines some key further differences that applied prior 
to the Fukushima accident, in respect equally of the absolute scales of respective nuclear electricity production 
and the relative degrees of national dependence on nuclear power. Figure 3 shows that the significantly 
greater scale of the German nuclear electricity production extends back into historical periods well before the 
development of the German Energiewende. Even as late as the Fukushima accident in 2011, the nuclear share 
of total electricity production was 25% in Germany and 19% in the UK and the total amount of electricity 
produced from nuclear in Germany was more than double that in the UK.  
 
Table 3: Indicators of nuclear size and penetration in the UK and Germany 
 GERMANY UK 
Total nuclear capacity  MWe 
(2010) 
20,339 MW 10,038 MW 
Historic maximum nuclear 
production in one year (GWh) 
171,305  
(in 2001) 
99,486  
(in 1998) 
% share of electricity 
generation in overall mix 
(2010) 
22.2% 16.27% 
Historic maximum % share of 
nuclear in generation mix 
31% 28% 
Number of reactors in 2010 17 16 
Average size of individual 
reactors (MW) 
1048 MW 581 MW 
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Source: IEA (2015a); IEA (2015b) World Nuclear Association (2015a); World Nuclear Association (2015b) 
 
Figure 3: German and UK Production of nuclear power (GWh) 1990-2012 
           
Source: IEA (2015a); IEA (2015b) 
Figure 4: Percentage share of nuclear power in generation mix 
 
Source: IEA (2015a); IEA (2015b) 
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Çeteris paribus proposition 
It is clear from this both in relative and absolute terms, that nuclear generation has long been significantly 
more important in Germany than in the UK. Considering this particular factor in isolation then, it might 
reasonably be inferred that Germany would face far greater challenges than the UK in seeking to close its 
nuclear power facilities. On these specific grounds, any ceteris paribus assessment of likely relative degrees of 
lock-in, would consider transformation in Germany correspondingly less likely than the UK.  
 
3.0: the relative strengths of the nuclear engineering sector in terms of performance in 
manufacturing and operational equipment supply and associated industrial lobbies 
3.1: Performance of plants  
The most crucial general measure of performance in the nuclear generating industry is load factor, referring to 
actual output as a fraction of total possible output. In these terms, the 13 highest performing nuclear power 
plants worldwide are sited in only 3 countries: 6 in South Korea, 5 in Germany, and 2 in Finland (Thomas, 
2005). German reactors hold the first eight positions in Nuclear Engineering International's league table of the 
reactors that have generated the most electricity to date (World Nuclear News, 2008). Load factor is an 
important proxy for manufacturing and equipment quality, because it is dependent to a large extent on system 
engineering. So it is relevant in this regard, that, the top three lifetime electricity generators (TWh) at the end 
of 2011 were all in Germany – Grafenrheinfeld, Grohnde, and Philippsburg 2 (Nuclear Engineering 
International, 2012). The best performing reactor in the world in terms of average lifetime load factor is 
Grohnde in Germany (ibid). On many other indicators including construction costs, capital costs, operating 
costs, and load factor, Germany is considered to host one of the best performing nuclear engineering 
industries in the world (Bruninx et al., 2013). This is in strong contrast to the UK, where, as documented by the 
Environmental Audit Committee report, Keeping the Lights On (2006) the UK performs strikingly poorly overall 
on most international comparisons related to plant performance. 
 
3.2: Comparison of constitution of respective nuclear industries in Germany and the UK 
This section provides a broad overview of the different aspects of the nuclear supply chain that are present in 
Germany and the UK. As background, figure 5 below summarises relations between these key nuclear 
industrial activities: 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
 
Figure 5: aspects of nuclear supply chain 
 
Source: World Nuclear Association (2015c) 
 
The focus in this analysis is nuclear power itself (rather than ancillary industries). And it can be seen from the 
above diagram that this holds a central place in the industry structure. Indeed, this is the activity that accrues 
the vast bulk of the exogenous revenue streams that sustain the sector as a whole.  So, it is reasonable to 
begin  an  inspection  of  the  industrial  strength  of  each  country’s  respective  overall  nuclear industry with those 
activities that relate most directly to the operation of nuclear generating plant. Table 4 details these. 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: main nuclear industry in Germany and the UK 
 
 Germany UK 
Reactor Vendor companies Siemens one of the most 
successful reactor vendors in 
world.  Decades-long reactor sales 
experience. Reactor sales to Brazil, 
Iran, Argentina and Eastern 
European states until abandoning 
nuclear operations in 2012 
No nuclear reactor vending since 
the 1960s when UKAEA sold a total 
of 2 reactors to Japan. 
Companies involved in 
operation, ownership and sale 
of nuclear electricity 
RWE, E.ON, EnBW, all international 
nuclear operators headquartered 
in Germany 
There is no UK headquartered 
company that is a major nuclear 
power utility company 
Total commercial Turnover  £10 billion £4 Billion 
Nuclear labour force in civilian 
nuclear power (directly 
employed by nuclear 
companies) 
38,000 (civilian nuclear power 
excluding waste disposal) 
30,000 (excluding waste disposal 
such as Sellafield that employs 
10,000 people) 
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Sources: (Cogent, 2009; DECC, 2013; Environmental Audit Committee, 2006; Piening, 2001) 
It must also be added, however, that the UK does have substantial nuclear expertise in other areas. In 
particular, Rolls Royce manufacturers component parts for nuclear plants. Rather than new build however, the 
UK’s   nuclear   industrial   expertise   now   lies  mainly   with   ‘backend’   processes,   including   decommissioning   and  
waste disposal, as seen in the figure below.  
Table 5: Examples of other areas of nuclear activity 
 
 Germany UK 
Provision of components and 
systems control technology 
Advanced Nuclear Fuels, Bilfinger 
Berger Power Services, Nukem 
Energy  
Rolls Royce (safety-critical 
instrumentation and control 
technology), AMEC, Thompson 
Valves, Glowserve Worcester 
controls, Doosan Babcok 
Decommissioning and waste 
disposal 
Gesellschaft Für Niklear-Service 
(GNS), Nukemtechnologies 
Magnox LTD, Energy Solutions, 
Sellafield LTD, Dounreay Site 
Restoration LTD, Cavendish 
Nuclear Waste Management 
Fuel Enrichment and associated 
technology  
Urenco (uranium enrichment 
consortium between Germany, 
Netherlands, and the UK) 
Urenco 
Sources: (GNS, 2015; Nuclear Industry Association, 2015; NUKEM Technologies, 2015; NUKEM, 2015; URENCO, 
2015) 
3.3: Research and Development in nuclear power 
Research and development in nuclear fission also provides an interesting basis for comparison between the UK 
and Germany. The UK used to be a world leader in the development of fission technologies, with an R&D 
workforce in excess of 8,000 and an annual R&D budget of over £300m/year in the 1980s. At present the 
human capacity is less than 600 and funding less than 10% of the historical level (House of Lords Science and 
Technology Select Committee, 2011).  The UK Spends around 1.8% of its energy R&D budget on fission 
research. This contrasts strongly with Germany, which as late as 2009 (despite a long term policy of phasing 
out nuclear power), still spent 7.3% of its energy R&D on nuclear fission technology. Of the corresponding 
figures for the UK, the Birmingham   Policy   Commission   Report   (2012:   80)   found   that   “[t]his   level   is   more  
commensurate  with  a  policy  to  phase  out  nuclear  energy  than  an  ambition  to  build  new  nuclear  plants”.   
Germany has consistently spent more money on nuclear-related R&D than the UK (fig. 6). The graph below 
charts historic UK and German expenditure on nuclear R&D. The following graph (fig.7) which shows the 
nuclear proportion of total civilian energy R&D spend in each country: 
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Figure 6: UK and German civilian nuclear R&D expenditure in million Euro (2013 prices & exch.rates), 1974-
2013 
 
Source: IEA (2015c) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: nuclear R&D spend as a percentage of overall energy R&D spend (%) 
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Source: IEA (2015c) 
 
What is notable, is that despite phase-out being set in motion since the 1990s, German nuclear spend as a 
share of overall energy R&D remains higher than the UK between 1993-2013. Regardless of nuclear policies, 
then, the respective R&D pictures can be summarised as follows: the UK resembles in this respect a country 
that is committed to a phase-out  of  nuclear  power,  whilst  Germany’s  expenditure   resembles  a   country   that  
has a resurgent programme (Birmingham Policy Comission, 2012). As emphasised in a Carbon Connect report 
chaired by pro-nuclear  policy  advocates  Baroness  Bryony  Worthington  and  Charles  Hendry  MP,    “despite  the  
return of new nuclear power to Government plans for power sector investment since 2007, a 2013 review by 
the  Government’s  then  Chief  Scientific Advisor found that the institutional landscape and funding still reflected 
the  policy  environment  of  the  1990s  and  early  2000s”   (Lévêque, 2014: 25). What is more, as Figure 7 shows, 
nuclear activity in the UK is focussed on “the past (decommissioning) the present (safety and performance) 
and the very long term future (fusion), but not on developing new nuclear fission technologies or fuel cycles 
for  the  medium  to  long  term”  (ibid:  25). This is not indicative of any significant pressure from vested interests 
in R&D, towards attachment for nuclear power in the UK rather than Germany. 
 
 
3.4 Share of global nuclear Patents (national aggregate and by company) 
Another indicator of the relative strength of nuclear engineering activity, is the volume of patenting for nuclear 
fission technologies. Whilst there are many pitfalls in seeking to use patent data as indicators (Pavitt, 1985), 
there are nevertheless some striking results. The graph below (fig. 8) compares German patenting activity of 
Germany with that of France, as arguably the long-run historic global leader in this field (Hecht, 1998). Despite 
the contrast between a long-term nuclear phase out in Germany and a continued globally-leading commitment 
to nuclear power in France (for   instance,   at   75%  of   electricity   generation),   this   ‘innovation   index’   approach  
suggests Germany nuclear patenting activity actually increased from 1990 onwards despite policies putting in 
place the beginning of nuclear phase out following the Chernobyl disaster.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: German and French Innovation Index 
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Source: Lévêque (2010) 
As  described  by  the  author,  “Despite  this  decision  [to  phase  out  nuclear  power],  Germany  seems  to  innovate  
more in nuclear technology than France. It has a better innovation index (as defined as the number of yearly 
national patent applications in nuclear technology divided by the number of yearly national patent 
applications  in  all  technological  fields)  than  France.”  (Lévêque, 2010). 
Another important comparison relates to the share of total patents relating to nuclear power over the past 
few decades between countries. As seen in Figure 9, Germany has the second largest share of patents 
following the USA, with 25% of patents, whilst the UK has 2% of the patent share. What can also be seen are 
key differences in terms of what are considered to be the most innovative companies related to the nuclear 
sector, where Germany also outperforms the UK (fig. 10). 
 
 
Figure 9: Share of nuclear patents by country 
 
Source: Berthélemy (2012) 
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Figure 10: patent applications for civilian nuclear power by country 
 
Source: Berthélemy ( 2012) 
Three German companies (Siemens, Kraftwerk Union A.G, and Hochtemperatur-Reactor) can be found among 
the top ten in the world for nuclear patent applications. The UK Atomic Energy Authority, has the second 
lowest number of patent applications of the surveyed organisations, whilst the UK firm Babcock and Wilcox is 
higher up, at 7th  lowest from  bottom.  Babcock  and  Wilcox,   is   the  UK’s   largest  defence  contractor  after  BAE  
Systems and Rolls Royce, and much of its activity relates to military nuclear technology developments.  
In concluding this overview of key features of nuclear industry activity in the Germany and the UK,  the table 
below (table 6) summarises the overall picture. 
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Table 6: Summary table of Nuclear industry in the UK and Germany 
 
 Germany UK 
Total R&D spent on civilian nuclear 
1974-2012  
€31.4  Billion   €16.6  Billion  
% of total Energy R&D expenditure 
dedicated to civilian nuclear power, 
1974-2013 
47%  51%  
Amount spent on nuclear R&D in 
2010 
€11.7  million  €3.4  million  
% of overall expenditure of Energy 
related R&D in 2010 
11.5% 3.4% 
Approximate number of patent 
applications 1974-2008 
1050 250 
%  total of civilian nuclear patent 
applications 1974-2008 
25% 2% 
 
Çeteris paribus proposition  
It is clear that Germany has a far stronger nuclear industry on nearly all counts as opposed to the UK, and on 
this basis, the discontinuation of nuclear in Germany could be said to be less likely than the UK context. 
 
4.0:  Relative magnitudes and costs of available national renewable resource potentials  
 
4.1 Overall renewable Resource 
 
An important consideration when thinking about low carbon technological alternatives, are the potential 
reserves available in the respective countries, and the costs and operational ease with which this can be 
harnessed. This is a separate matter, to the relative capacities of the respective renewable industries, which is 
a distinct criterion.  In these terms, then, the renewable resource base is best understood as the energy that 
might potentially be utilised under comparable assumptions concerning resource availability and economic 
costs of exploitation. This involves both theoretical and technical considerations that are well explored in 
various intensive studies conducted across different European countries on a comparable basis (European 
Renewable Energy Council, 2010). The overall position as between Germany and the UK is quite unambiguous  
and – again – quite surprising in relation to the pattern of developments in this field.  
 
The UK has 40% of the total economic wind energy resource in Europe. It is repeatedly and without 
controversy assessed to enjoy the best wind resources on the continent (HM Government, 2014).  Scotland 
alone has 25% of the total for the whole of Europe (The Scottish Government, 2014).  As  the  ‘windiest  place  in  
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Europe’   (EDF Energy, 2014), the UK also has vast potentials for viable offshore wind power. With one of the 
longest coastlines in Europe at an estimated length of 12,429KM (CIA, 2014).  the picture is similar for wave 
and tidal power, where the UK alone is assessed to hold 50% of the total economic European potential (HM 
Government, 2014). The Severn estuary alone presents one of the most attractive sites in the world for 
development of large scale tidal power. In the case of hydroelectricity, most feasible sites in the UK are 
considered to already be utilised (DECC, 2009), with the technical challenge lying simply (and more marginally) 
in plant improvement. For these resource reasons, Wilson (2012) notes that a series of UK government reports 
in the 1970s identified the UK renewables industry as being potentially the cheapest in Europe, leading to a 
series of R%D proposals that will be discussed in the next criteria.  
 
For its part, Germany has a significantly smaller share of the European economically-exploitable resource for 
wind, wave and tidal energy. The German coastline is an estimated 2,389km (CIA, 2014) substantially smaller 
than the UK, so there in absolute terms there is less potential for offshore wind, wave and tidal development – 
the latter especially less favourable through the lack of exceptionally attractive sites like the Severn estuary 
(House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2013).  
 
An  important  factor  to  also  consider  is  the  ‘Cost-resource  Curves’ and future potential capacities and costs of 
renewable resources of the respective cases of Germany and the UK. This combines economic data related to 
wind  turbines,  the  assessment  of  the  number  of  ‘full  load  hours’  calculated  by  wind  speed  in  a  location  at  hub  
height, as measuring the available land that is suitable for deployment that along with wind speed. Thus an 
idea of potential amounts of production of wind power and the cost of achieving this amount is projected. The 
graph from Held (2012) below (fig. 11) displays comparative cost-resource curves for on-shore wind across 
European countries: 
 
 
Figure 11: Cost resource Curve for onshore wind in European countries 
 
 
 
 
Source: Held (2010) 
 
Clearly, the UK has the largest potential of exploitable wind resource as well as the cheapest wind resource in 
the Europe, outperforming Germany. This is also the picture for offshore wind as seen in Figure 12 below: 
 
 
 
 
34 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Cost resource curve for offshore wind resource in European countries 
 
 
 
Source: Source: European Environment Agency (2009) 
Cost Curves for solar are harder to come by, however the Green-X study in 2003 does nevertheless give an 
indication  of  capacity  potentials  for  2020  and  cost  estimates  in  €/  MWh.  As  detailed  in  Resch  et  al  (2003)  some 
parts of the UK have comparable solar resource as Germany yet have not exploited this resource and 
discrepancies between resource potential and relative costs are small. Table 7 below, details the key 
differences: 
 
Table 7: Comparative solar resource and costs for Germany and the UK 
 
 
 Germany UK 
Mid term potential (GWh) 52393 43040 
Capacity potential (MW) 71929 64844 
Average Full load hours 728 664 
Cost  of  electricity  (min)  (  €/  MWh) 716,0 787,6 
Cost  of  electricity  (Max)  (€/MWh) 1423,0 1565,3 
Cost  of  Electricity  (average)  (€/  
MWh) 
970,0 1063,1 
 
Source: Resch et al (2003) 
 
 
Whilst costs are difficult to ascertain it is well known that the UK possesses the best resource in terms of wave 
and tidal in Europe (table 8): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
Table 8: Wave and tidal potential resource 
 
 Germany  UK 
Realisable potential up to 2020 
(TWh) 
 7,73 58,90 
  
Source: Resch et al (2006) 
Biomass may also prove an important part of a renewables strategy and in terms of future cost estimates and 
cost curves entails potential difficulties due to variability of production of argricultural products and other 
diverse forms of potential biomass sources. The table below (table 9) however, details the mid-term potential 
and costs of biomass between Germany and the UK. Depending on assumptions, the position of Germany 
might be generally more favourable than suggested in this table, due to the relatively greater access to 
important supply sources in Scandinavia. However, if landfill gas is considered to be a form of biomass (often 
the case in the UK, where it is arguably among the most attractive of such resources),the long-standing 
adoption of recycling and incineration as waste management strategies in Germany has the opposite 
implication for the relative scale of the biomass resource.  
 
Biomass 
Table 9: Overview of additional realisable potential and costs of Biomass in Germany and the UK 
Biomass Product Germany  UK 
Biomass – forestry products    
Electricity gen. potential GWh 14560 1834 
Short  run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 62.3 65.9 
Long-run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 100.6 104.2 
Biomass Forestry products, Combined heat 
and power (CHP) 
  
Electricity gen. potential GWh 12675 1596 
Long-run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 69.4 73.1 
Short  run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 38.3 42.4 
Biomass Forestry Residues (pure power 
generation) 
  
Electricity gen. potential GWh 6271 3440 
Long-run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 58.0 71.0 
Short  run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 33.5 33.5 
Biomass Forestry Residues (CHP) 6271 3440 
Electricity gen. potential GWh 5459 2995 
Long-run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 84.4 84.4 
Short  run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) -4.2 -4.2 
Biomass – agricultural products (PPG)   
Electricity gen. potential GWh 22966 12893 
Long-run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 118.6 123.6 
Short  run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 80.3 85.3 
Biomass – agricultural residues (PPG)   
Electricity gen. potential GWh 12926 6848 
Long-run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 97.1 100.6 
Short  run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 58.7 62.3 
Biomass Agricultural Residues (CHP)   
Electricity gen. potential GWh 11252 5962 
Long-run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 113.3 117.5 
Short  run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 24.7 28.8 
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Biomass – biodegradable fraction of waste 
(PPG) 
  
Electricity gen. potential GWh 4677 3442 
Long-run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 84.4 84.4 
Short  run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) -0.3 -0.3 
Biomass – biodegradable fraction of waste 
(CHP) 
  
Long-run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 29.5 29.5 
Short  run  marginal  costs  (€/MWh) 58.6 58.6 
 
Source: Fhg-isi, Huber, & Eeg, (2003) 
 
Çeteris paribus proposition 
 
It is possible to conclude on the data available that the UK has a superior renewable resource in terms of both 
types of wind and wave and tidal, the other forms of renewable energy, which are harder to predict, Germany 
may be marginally better off, but the flexibility of solar in terms of its ability to be distributed on buildings 
complicates this situation, as well as the variability in biomass production being harder to ascertain. The fact 
that it was known since the 1970s that the UK possessed the cheapest and most abundant wind resource in 
Europe compared to Germany, this would point again to Germany having greater dependence on nuclear and 
therefore attempted discontinuation being less likely in Germany than the UK.  
 
 
 
5.0: The scale of national industrial capacities and interests to address renewable energy supply  
 
This section gives an overview of renewable energy capacities in Germany and the UK and the industrial 
interests that surround these technologies. This outlines in a series of tables documenting growth in various 
renewables from 1990-2012 from IEA data in both the UK and Germany, R&D expenditure into various 
renewables technologies as a proxy for likely support in certain technologies, assessment of constitution of 
renewables industries and equipment supply industries in each country, and qualitative assessments of 
general narratives of support for renewables proceeding the growing capacity for renewables. 
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5.1: Overview of renewables growth in Germany and the UK 
 
 
As the figure below demonstrates, Germany has deployed more wind capacity at an earlier stage to the UK. 
 
Figure 13: wind power: Wind power capacity (GWh)  
 
  
    
 
Source:  IEA (2015a); IEA (2015b)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: % share of wind in electricity generation  
 
 
 
 
Source: IEA (2015a); IEA (2015b)  
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Figure 15: Deployment of Offshore wind capacity in Germany and the UK (MW) 
 
 
 
Source: Kern et al (2014); DECC (2014); EWEA (2014) 
 
 
Solar power 
 
Figure 16 outlines the growth in solar capacity in both Germany and the UK. Germany again, experienced rapid 
growth in solar power compared to UK growth only beginning several years after Germany with the Feed in 
Tariff  system  for  solar  established  in  2010,  10  years  after  Germany’s  Renewable  Energy  Act. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Deployment of Solar PV  (GWh) 
 
 
 
 
Source: IEA (2015a); IEA (2015b) 
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Biomass 
 
Germany and the UK have both utilised biofuels and biomass, which have grown as a proportion of electricity 
production as seen from the tables below. In the UK increasing use of biomass was supported through the 
Non-Fossil Fuels Obligation and then the Renewables Obligation, with DECC later implementing Feed-InTarrifs 
for small scale biomass in 2010. In Germany biomass has been stimulated by the Electricity Act of 1990, the 
Renewable Energy Act 2000, and the National Biomass Action Plan in 2009. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17 Bio waste contribution to electricity supply in Germany and the UK (%)    
 
 
 
Source: IEA (2015a); IEA (2015b) 
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Figure 18: Percentage of electricity provided by biofuels (%) 
 
 
 
  
 
Source: IEA (2015a); IEA (2015b) 
 
What is undoubtedly clear is that in all technological areas asides from Offshore wind development in which 
the UK is a world leader in terms of total amount of installations deployed, Germany has generally deployed 
more renewable energy, beginning in most cases, at a notably earlier stage than the UK. Now the general 
patterns related to R&D and industry surrounding these trends is looked at. 
 
 
 
5.2: Research and development  
 
Figure 19 below traces the percentage share of R&D expenditure as a share of total R&D expenditure on 
energy, and the table that follows (table 10) outlines key facts related to this: 
 
Figure 19: % Renewable energy R&D as a share of total Energy R&D 
 
 
 
Source: IEA (2015c) 
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Table 10: Total Renewables R&D spend, Percentage of renewable R&D as part of total energy R&D and total 
civilian nuclear R&D, 1974-2013 
 
 Germany UK 
Total Renewables R&D 1974-2013 €4.5  Billion €1.5  billion 
% Renewables as share of total 
energy R&D, 1974-2013 
13% 9% 
% Renewables R&D as share of 
total nuclear R&D, 1974-2013 
29% 18% 
 
Source: IEA (2015c) 
 
The UK devoted a smaller share of energy R&D to renewable energy sources until 2002 when the UK rapidly 
increased its share of energy R&D spent on renewables. This declined sharply in 2008 following the financial 
crisis and again in 2010 following change in Government. What is most interesting from our perspective 
however, is that in the 1970s through the early 1980s the share of energy R&D spent on renewables by the UK 
and Germany were comparable before Germany began to rapidly increase its R&D spend on renewables 
following reorientation of spending due to policy responses to Chernobyl.  
 
Figures 20 and 21 below show R&D funding in renewable energy. Activity in both Germany and the UK was 
sparked initially by the Oil Crisis of 1974. The countries both took different approaches as documented by the 
following figures: 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Ocean Energy R&D, UK and Germany in million Euro (2013 prices & exch.rates), 
 
     
 
 
 
Source: IEA (2015c) 
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Figure 21: R&D expenditure on wind energy 1974-1994 in million Euro (2013 prices & exch.rates) 
 
 
 
Source: IEA (2015c) 
 
 
During the 1970s in the UK there was substantial public investment in ocean energy whilst Germany was 
negligible. Germany began to invest substantially in wind energy R&D in 1977, with a notable peak of spending 
the  equivalent  of  €40  million  in  1981,  before a rapid decrease in spending. It should be noted that throughout 
the 1980s, the UK was spending on par, or in some years, spending more than Germany throughout the period 
from 1982-1992 a   crucial   formative   period   preceding   the   ‘take   off’   of   the   Energiewende. In terms of R&D 
spend on wind energy as a percentage of total renewables R&D funding the UK was devoting a greater share 
of its R&D resource to wind energy through the 1980s before R&D spend on energy was considerably reduced 
in the 1990s (fig. 22): 
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Figure 22: % wind energy R&D spend as share of overall renewable R&D funding, 1974-1990 
 
 
 
Source: IEA (2015c) 
 
Thus, Throughout the 1980s the UK was spending at similar levels to Germany (fig.21) and devoting a greater 
share of its renewables budget to wind power (fig. 22). This was despite  Germany’s  initial  steep  and  short  lived  
increase in renewables spending at the end of the 70s. The two countries are now assessed in more detail in 
terms of narratives surrounding the evolution of renewables policies in Germany and the UK. 
 
 
5.3: General Narratives of renewables policy 
 
 
It   is  crucial  to   focus  also  on  more  narrative  based  accounts  surrounding  the  period  before  the  German  ‘take  
off’  in  renewables  began,  as  well  as  focussing on R&D spending. This focusses on support for renewables in the 
general policy environment. As  Smith & Raven (2012) point out, analysis of socio-technical change often 
identifies   ‘niches’   or   ‘protective   spaces’   in   terms   of   Research   and  Development   priorities  without sufficient 
explanation  of  how  such  spaces  arise  and  how  they  are  ‘protected’.  The  contested  nature  of  emerging  niches  
are often missed. Drawing on historical accounts of energy policies in Germany and the UK the table below 
outlines the evolution of renewables policy in each context: 
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Table 11: General narratives of renewables policy in Germany and the UK 
 
 Germany UK 
Phases of 
renewable 
energy policy 
support 
 
Phase 1 (1974-1989): The first 15 years of 
RES-E policy after 1974 were devoted 
to R&D. Market creation measures only came 
after 1988. 
 
Phase 2 (1989-onwards): Government 
reorientation towards market penetration by 
means of technology specific investment 
programs and feed in tarrifs (1,000 solar 
roofs program and 100-250MW.   Germany’s 
energy market was liberalised in 1998, 
however FiTs continued to be refined 
through the Energy Act 1999, leading to 
rapid growth in wind energy and later solar 
PV.  
Phase 1 (1974-1989): Government support 
for technical innovations for wave energy in 
the 1970s and large wind power in the 
1980s 
 
Phase 2 (1989 onwards): Privatisation of 
energy in Electricity Act.  Phasing out of 
government support for renewables during 
the 1990s due to expectation of private 
finance filling the gap, which did not occur. 
Non-fossil fuels obligation and later 
Renewables obligation favoured over 
technology specific technologies, and more 
direct market interventions such as FiTs.  
 
Policy support 
for renewables 
in phase 1 (pre- 
German   ‘take  
off’) 
1974 – implementation of R&D programmes 
for Solar and wind.  
1978 -  rapid increases in R&D spend on wind 
research and demonstration. 
1978 - German Solar Energy 
Industries Association set up 
1979 - Dedicated University research centres 
set up to explore renewable energy.  
1980 – Enquette commission, recommended 
efficiency and renewables as first priority but 
also the maintenance of the nuclear option. 
1981 - Federal Ministry of Research and 
Technology, 5 year study on renewables and 
energy efficiency. 
1988 –Wind and Solar targets set. 
 1990- Feed-in-Law 
 
 
 
1973 – CPRS Report on Energy Policy 
advising immediate support of a British 
wave energy programme. 
1974-  formation of the Energy Technology 
Support Unit (ETSU) 
1975 - National Engineering Laboratory 
(NEL) positive report on prospects of Wind 
Energy 
1975 – Formation of Wave Energy Research 
Programme 
1976 – setting of ambitious targets for 
Wave power by 
 Steering Committee (WESC) for targeted 
government support forR&D. 
1978 – Wind Energy Steering Committee 
(WISC) formed,  
1980s – ambitious targets set for Wind 
Energy by WISC.  
1990 – Non-fossil Fuels Obligation 
Support for 
renewables in 
civil society 
Much civil society support and organisation 
for renewables; NGOs, Greenpeace, FoE, 
Institute of Ecology  (Ӧko-Institut), 
Forderverein Solarenergie, Eurosolar 
Broad coalition of support for renewables in 
civil society: FoE, Greenpeace, CPRE, 
popularity  of  ‘soft  energy  path’  and  shift  to  
renewables, largely generated by 
opposition to nuclear power in civil society 
(Wilson, 2012).   
Resistance to 
renewables 
promotion 
Government firmly committed to expansion 
of nuclear power in 1970s, limited 
renewables support; Substantial reduction in 
renewables R&D spend enacted by 
conservative government in 1982; Ministry 
of Economic Affairs offering minimal support 
for renewables; Ministry for Research 
prioritising nuclear R&D in the 1980s 
creating unfavourable conditions for 
renewables 
Discontinuation of wave energy programme 
in 1982; CEGB prioritising promotion of 
nuclear; opposition from distribution 
networks towards wind energy;  Decisions 
to reduce wind R&D in anticipation of 
privatisation; unrealistic targets set by DoEn 
resulting  in  ‘failed’  demonstration  projects;   
 
Sources: (Jacobsson & Lauber, 2006; Lauber & Mez, 2004; Wilson, 2012) 
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In summary as backed up by the literature (Lipp, 2007; Mitchell, Bauknecht, & Connor, 2006; Wilson, 2012), 
there was considerable enthusiasm early on regarding renewable energy in both Germany and the UK. The 
UK’s  R&D funding related to wind energy in the  1980s  actually   increased  whilst  Germany’s  decreased.  Both  
countries possessed strong advocacy coalitions and civil society support, and both faced significant political 
competition from vested interests – vested interests that, as can be seen from the other criteria, were 
arguably stronger in Germany than the UK, when the extent of industry related to nuclear power in 
considered.  
 
 
 
5.4: Industrial strength – equipment supply industries 
 
The tables below aim to give a general overview of differing aspects of the equipment supply industries of 
Germany and the UK with respect to renewable energy. Once more, it must be added that given space 
constraints this is by no means exhaustive, however aims to outline the general patterns.  
 
Table 12: overview of renewables capacity  
 
 Germany UK 
Gross electricity generation from 
renewables (2012, GWh) 
156106 46105 
2014 renewables production 
figures (%) total electricity 
production) 
28%  14.5%  
Total annual investment in 
renewables industry (£) 
£24 Billion £12 billion 
Number of people employed in 
renewable industry   
371,000 103,000 
  
 
Source: DUKES (2014); IEA (2015a); IEA (2015b); Irena (2014); Renewable Energy Association (2015)  
 
Figure 34: Wind Energy Industry 
 Germany UK 
Main Turbine parts 
Manufacturers  
Enercon, Nordex, REPower, 
Vensys, Siemens 
At present, the UK does not have 
British companies engaging in the 
manufacturing of main turbine 
parts.  
Component Parts 
Manufacturers  
Eckerle Hydraulic Division,  
SCHAAF GmbH & Co KG, 
Friedrich Wilhelms-Hütte 
Eisenguss, Haw Hydraulik SE   
 
 
GE Power, James Walker Tension 
Control   Systems,   ‘Blade  Materials’  
produced by BGB (slip rings) and 
Cooper and Turner (large slip 
rings), and Gear boxes produced 
by Dave Brown Gear Systems. Also 
‘developmental   activities’  
including planning and consultancy 
work. 
 
Sources: (BVG Associates, 2014; Lütkenhorst & Pegels, 2014; RenewableUK, 2015; Wind Power Monthly, 2015) 
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Table 13: offshore wind industry 
 Germany UK 
Global positioning in the 
production of offshore wind 
energy, cumulative installed 
capacity (MW)  
628 MW  3681 MW 
Main Turbine Manufacturers  Siemens, BARD, REpower There are currently no UK based 
Turbine manufacturers 
Offshore wind development RWE, E.ON,   SSE Renewables 
Utility ownership of Offshore 
wind 
RWE, E.ON Centrica, SSE Renewables 
Foundations, Component part 
manufacture, developmental 
work.  
EEW, Friedrich Wilhelms-Hütte, 
MeuselwitzGuss, Siempelkamp, 
Georgsmarienhütte, Richter 
Maschinenfabrik, Bosch 
Rexroth, Eickhoff, Liebherr,     
GE Power, James Walker Tension 
Control   Systems,   ‘Blade  Materials’  
produced by BGB (slip rings) and 
Cooper and Turner (large slip 
rings), and Gear boxes produced 
by Dave Brown Gear Systems. Also 
‘developmental   activities’  
including planning and consultancy 
work. 
 
Sources: (BVG Associates, 2014; HM Government, 2013; Wind Power Monthly, 2015) 
Table 14: Solar industry overview 
 Germany UK 
Total capacity (MW) 26 380 MW 1188 MW 
Ranking of solar market 
in Europe 
2nd  7th 
Industrial profile  There are 46 companies based in 
Germany manufacturing silicon, wafer, 
cell modules, 61 companies producing PV 
module materials, 53 producing PV 
system components, 94 producing PV 
equipment suppliers, 63 producing PV 
mounting tracking systems, and 73 
specialist R&Dinstitutions focussed on 
innovation in solar energy. World-leading 
companies include Bosch, Solar Energy, 
Schott Solar, Conergy, SolarWorld, 
Sovello. It must be noted that the 
German PV Industry is facing significant 
problems with many companies going 
out of business due to cheap solar 
production in China rendering much 
German manufacturing uncompetitive, 
as well as takeovers by Chinese 
companies.  
There are currently no UK-based 
manufacturers of solar modules, 
Substantial expertise has been 
built in the UK with installations 
and maintenance of solar panels 
including Solar Century, Solar 
Tech, Big Green Company, A 
Shade Greener, Solus, Emotion 
Energy, South Downs Solar, Space 
Renewable Energy LTD.   
Jobs supported 87,500 15,620 
Sources: (ENF Solar, 2015; Pegels & Lütkenhorst, 2014) 
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Table 15: Biomass industry 
 Germany UK 
Installed capacity (GW)  11504 4158 
Ranking of biomass production 
in Europe 
1st 3rd 
Industry profile Key players operating in German 
biomass include: RWE Power, AE E 
Lentjes, GmbH, BMP Biomasse 
Projekt GmbH, Interargem, BPRe 
Biopower Renewable Energy, 
ENRO AG, 
PROKON Nord Energiesysteme, 
GEE Energy GmbH Co KG, and 
EnBW Energie Baden-
Wurttemberg 
The  UK’s  biomass market is largely 
dominated by Drax Power Limited, 
a UK company.  
Wartsila Corporation, E.ON UK, 
Scottish and Southern Energy, EDF 
Energy, Energy Power Resources 
(EPR), Bronzeoak Company, 
Purepower Holdings Limited, and 
Welsh 
Power Group Limited.  
 
Sources: IEA (2015a); IEA (2015b); Irena (2014) 
 
Çeteris paribus proposition  
From the above it can be concluded that Germany has a stronger renewables sector than the UK with greater 
penetration in the electricity mix and dominance in supply chains for renewable technology. The UK has 
however lead the way in recent years in terms of deployment of offshore wind. However, discontinuation from 
nuclear could be said to be more likely in Germany in terms of this criterion.   
 
6.0 relative scales of military-related nuclear activities and associated industrial interests 
6.1 nuclear weapons capabilities 
The difference between the UK and Germany regarding nuclear weaponry is stark. Germany has no 
operational warheads, the UK is estimated presently to have 225 (Norris and Kristensen, 2013). Although 
explorations were made in the 1950s for research programs these were abandoned, and Germany has 
produced no warheads, whereas the UK has produced at least 1,250 nuclear warheads between 1953-2003, 
with a peak arsenal of 500 between 1974-1981 (ibid). Over ensuing years the UK carried out a large number of 
tests of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons in locations including Australia, Christmas Island, and joint tests 
with the U.S.A in Nevada (Arnold, 2001), Germany carried out no tests. Britain also developed its own type of 
bomb, with much research effort going in to the development of  There remains widespread support in the UK 
Parliament  for  renewal  or  ‘modernisation’  of  the  Trident  weapons  system  to  continue  the  UK’s  long term aim 
of   ‘independent  strategic  deterrence’  (MoD,  2013),  although  for  the  UK  Parliament’s  third  biggest  party,  the  
SNP, are principally opposed to Trident renewal, however still only have 56 Members of Parliament. As a result 
of the post-war settlement Germany has no such aims and is prohibited from doing so by international law.  
 
6.2 Nuclear Ballistic Missile Infrastructure 
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There is considerable infrastructure surrounds the nuclear missile capability of the UK. This includes AWE 
Aldermaston that is involved in the design, manufacture, and support of warheads. There is significant 
corporate interest in this area with the site being managed by Jacobs Engineering Group, Lockheed Martin UK, 
Serco,  and  with  the  UK  Government  maintaining  a  ‘golden  share’  in all weapons facilities. There is also a site at 
Burghfield, and missiles are loaded on to submarines at HMNB Clyde near Glasgow. More than 4000 people 
are employed at Aldermaston, and more than 6,000 at Faslane (Hartely, 2012). There is no such infrastructure 
in Germany. 
 
6.3 Nuclear propelled submarines  
The UK has also had a long history of powering submarines using nuclear technology.  Currently operable are 
four Vanguard Class nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines and six Trafalgar and Astute Class nuclear-
powered attack submarines (Royal Navy, 2013). When the construction run is completed the Royal Navy will 
operate seven of the new Astute Class boats (ibid). All these vessels are powered by specialised PWR reactors 
constructed by Rolls-Royce (Watts, 2011). The UK continues to face significant challenges regarding the safe 
disposal of nuclear reactors of the 27 retired nuclear submarines (Hartely, 2012). Nuclear warheads continue 
to be refurbished at the Atomic Weapons Establishment at Aldermaston, which also carries out substantial 
nuclear research (AWE Aldermaston, 2013). It is clear that there exists substantial capacity and expertise 
relating to specialised nuclear applications in weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems in the 
UK. Germany has no nuclear-propelled submarines. What is more, in the UK, submarines are considered to be 
a  key  industry  and  one  of  important  scientific  standing  considering  they  are  often  thought  of  as  ‘man’s most 
complex  machine’  (Downing, 2014).  Nuclear  submarines  form  an  important  part  of  UK’s  engineering  expertise  
(Chalmers & Chalmers, 2013). 
6.4 Military-related equipment supply industries  
The UK is a lead player in equipment supply industry for military related activity in the nuclear sector, related 
to nuclear-propelled submarines and missile systems. Rolls-Royce, a UK company, is a world-leader in 
designing, manufacturing, and operating various components related to nuclear-propelled submarines. This 
includes being the authority for the UK nuclear steam raising plant which is all a crucial element in all UK 
nuclear submarines (Rolls-Royce, 2014). In 2007 the MoD signed a landmark 10-year contract of up to £1 
billion with Rolls-Royce to provide through-life support for the pressurized reactors on-board current 
submarines, and for the production of new components for the new SSN Astute Class and SSBN Vanguard Class 
submarines (Defence Industry Daily, 2007). Rolls-Royce also operate the on-land Vulcan testing facility (a 
submarine reactor based on land at Dounreay). In June 2012, the MoD signed a 1.1 billion contract with Rolls-
Royce to sustain reactor core production at its Raynesway plant In Derby and refurbish the Raynesway site 
(Nuclear info, 2013). Rolls Royce has abandoned all other energy-related research and is concentrating 
investment in nuclear-related activity (Nuclear Energy Insider, 2014). Military-related engineering expertise 
thus forms a potentially important part of UK innovation strategy more broadly and can occupy important 
policy positions, for the chairman of the Engineering council is currently Rear Admiral Nigel Guild (Guild 2014 
in Walport 2014) who was formerly controller of the Navy (Clements, 2006).  
6.5 Stated future plans for military renewal 
The UK has committed to the renewal of its nuclear missile Trident deterrent system (MoD, 2013) and has 
already signed contracts with American firm General dynamics worth £37 million (Edwards, 2014). The UK has 
committed to a new fleet of nuclear submarines to replace the Vanguard class. Germany has no ambitions on 
either of these fronts.   
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Çeteris paribus proposition  
It is very difficult to make conclusions regarding this criterion. If the formal and tightly enforced separation of 
civilian and civil nuclear is the case then it is difficult to make conclusions regarding how military related 
nuclear activity would impinge on decision making related to civil nuclear. However, a substantial body of 
literature notes the historic and in some international contexts, continued entwinement of both sectors. If this 
is the basis for an assessment, then discontinuation would be more likely in Germany than the UK. This 
criterion must be kept open.  
 
7.0: Relevant characteristics of general national political institutions and elite cultures 
7.1: centralised / decentralised political systems 
The UK is a more centralised political system than Germany. The UK is a parliamentary democracy with the 
monarch   as   head   of   state.   The   UK   utilises   a   ‘first-past-the-post’   electoral   system,   where   a   government   is  
elected on a simple majority basis in elections that occur every five years. The first past the post elections take 
place in single-member constituencies, where the winning candidate becomes sole representative of the 
constituency in Parliament (Electoral reform, 2013). This UK system is – in international terms – unusually 
concentrated.  
This contrasts strongly with the German system. Germany is a federal democracy divided into 16 regions or 
Länder. Thus there are Federal Laws applying to the whole of Germany, and laws that are only applicable to 
the land in question (Bundestag, 2013). Land laws cannot take precedence over Federal law, a factor that is 
enshrined in Article 31 of the Basic Law (ibid). Some laws cannot be made at the level of the Länder, such as all 
defence, foreign policy issues, currency and money, citizenship, the unity of the customs and trading area and 
cooperation between the Federation and the Länder. This difference between devolved and reserved matters 
is similar to those currently being proposed in the UK following the Scottish independence referendum and 
landslide election result of the Scottish Nationalists in the 2015 General election . As well as this, there are 
thirteen more Länder than the devolved nations of the UK, and thus the German system represents a more 
decentralised political framework, with profound implications for democratic engagement.  
 
7.2: Prominence of Green Party 
In Germany, due to the proportional representation system, it has been easier for the Green Party to gain 
seats in the Bundestag, and indeed, they have been involved in mainstream German political life since the 
1980’s   (Glaser,  2013).  The  Alliance  90’/  The  Greens  Party   (Bündis  90/  Die  Grünen)   formed  through  a  merger  
between the Green Party of West Germany and Alliance 90 which formed during the uprising of 1989-1990.  
Before the two parties merged, The Green Party had several seats in the Bundestag, and with concern 
generated by the Chernobyl disaster, their anti-nuclear argument gained significant traction (Blowers and 
Lowry, 1998). The German Greens have served repeatedly in governments since 1998, when a key element of 
their   agenda   as   part   of   the   ‘red/green   coalition’   with   the   SDP   was   to   reach   an   agreement   with   energy  
companies  and  some  SDP  politicians  regarding  plans  for  the  ‘phase  out’  of  nuclear power. This was agreed in 
2000, and then implemented in the Atomic Energy Act 2002. The Greens were also part of a governing 
coalition between 2002-2005, continuing to oversee the first few years of the Renewables Energy Act 2001 
(Metzger, 2013). 
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In the UK, following the 2015 General Election, there is only one Green MP in Parliament, compared with 330 
Conservative MPs, 232 Labour MPs, and 56 SNP Members of parliament, however membership of the Green 
Party is growing. Whilst the SNP oppose the construction of new nuclear power in Scotland, in England all main 
political parties are in favour of the construction of new nuclear. As well as this, it was not until 2010 that a 
Green Party MP won a seat, displaying that their voice has been significantly more marginal in mainstream 
political debate than in Germany.   
 
7.3:  prominence of deliberative-style politics 
To understand the patterns of German and UK political decision-making, it is important to look at the 
respective voting systems and how they influence how decisions are made.  In broad terms, the German 
system is an attempt to create a voting system between two – the   British   ‘winner-takes- all’   approach  
favoured by Anglo-Saxon countries, with a proportional representation systems that enables smaller parties to 
enter parliament (The Economist, 2013). In Germany two preferences are made on the ballot paper – one for a 
representative of a district of which there are 299 districts. The second vote is for choice of party, and if the 
party meets the 5% threshold then they occupy their share of second votes, or three directly elected members 
of parliament. This leads to far greater diversity of perspectives in German politics, and means that coalitions 
are  a  frequent  occurrence.  The  ‘winner  takes  all’  and  the first past the post system in the UK, also referred to 
as  ‘the  Westminster  model’ (Lijphart, 2012),  is  articulated  as  an   ‘adversarial’   system,  where   there  are   less  
‘veto   powers’   from critics of particular policies. On the other hand, the German model is understood as a 
‘consensual  model’  where  there  are  more  veto  powers   for  a  wider  distribution  of  critics   (Strohmeier, 2008). 
Deliberative politics is considered more prevalent in Germany as a consequence across all sectors of society 
where  ‘negotiation’  between  different  groups  including  businesses,  trade  unions,  and  various  political  parties  
to produce a shared vision, rather than majoritarian rule without the same levels of deliberation as in the UK 
(Lijphart, 2002). Despite Germany previously not having a decision-making structure on nuclear that NGOs felt 
adequately engaged in (Jahn, 1992; Kitschelt, 1986),   German   democracy   has   been   ‘transformed’   through  
environmental issues (Dryzek, 2000) and NGOs and critical voices were included in German decision-making 
measures, visible in the Ethics Commission report following Fukushima (Ethics Commission, 2011), a report 
commissioned by Greenpeace that was at the heart of decision-making. Despite ostensible engagement 
between Government and NGOs over nuclear issues in the UK, NGOs abandoned the nuclear consultations as 
they   felt   they  were  a   ‘sham’,   and   following   Fukushima   for   example,   no  direct  participation  or  discussion  of  
ethical issues involving NGOs was conducted as it was in Germany.   
 
Çeteris paribus proposition 
Given the prominence of the Green Party in particular, as well as the potential role of more proportional and 
decentralising voting systems, it could be said that discontinuation would be more likely in Germany than the 
UK given the greater plurality of voices that are able to influence policy compared to the UK.  
 
 
8.0: Broader Presence and activity levels of relevant social movements 
Germany is generally regarded as having strong anti-nuclear sentiment (Winter, 2013), and this is often held 
up as being the main reason why the shift from nuclear has occurred (Johnson, 2011). It is important to 
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establish more nuanced understandings of public opinions around nuclear power, however the ‘public’  is  not  a  
static whole but rather the site of a variety of interests in numerous different aspects related to nuclear energy 
(Corner et al, 2011; Johnstone, 2014). As well as this it is crucial to establish the evolution of opinion given that 
again, a crucial consideration is public opinion during the formative period of the late 70s and 1980s preceding 
the policy starting point of the Energiewende in the late 1980s. Media representation is also an important 
consideration.  
 
8.1: generalised public opinion on nuclear power 
In general, polls conducted over the past few years have outlined greater public opposition to nuclear power in 
Germany than the UK (GlobalScan, 2011, Ipsos Mori, 2011; Globalscan, 2005). The polls conducted in 2011 
occurred after Fukushima once government policy to phase out nuclear power was in place, considered to be a 
highly influential factor in determining opposition to nuclear. However, going back to 2005, differences 
between German and UK opinion on nuclear can also be seen. In 2005 22% of respondents in Germany agreed 
that nuclear power is relatively safe, and important source of electricity, and new plants should be built, 
compared with 33% in the UK (BBC News, 2011a). In 2010 the NEA published an extensive report on public 
opinions on nuclear, charting opposition to nuclear power, as represented below: 
 
 
Figure 23: Public strongly opposed to nuclear power ranked 1-7 
 
Source: NEA (2010) 
Another point addressed by the NEA report, is the change in public opinion generated by the climate change 
issue. In 2010, the UK was only 6% points higher than Germany in terms of support for nuclear, after an 
explanation regarding climate change mitigation potential: 
 
Table 16: Change in public opinion generated by climate change association 
 Support for nuclear power (%) pre 
climate change mitigation 
explanation 
Support in nuclear power (%) 
post-climate change mitigation 
explanation 
Germany 22% 38% 
UK 33% 44% 
 
Source: NEA (2010) 
An important consideration is also public opinion during the turbulent period of the 1980s preceding the 
identified policy-based starting points of the German energy transition. In both Germany and the UK, opinion 
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polls though limited in number, showed general favour towards nuclear power (Van der Pligt, 1985). This 
began to change as the issue became more controversial in the late 1970s. Opinion polls conducted in 1982 
demonstrated that 52% of respondents in Germany were in favour of new nuclear power with 46% opposed 
whilst polls in the UK indicated that only 34% of respondents were in favour with 53% opposed (Renn, 1990).  
A poll taken a few months after Chernobyl, 70% opposed nuclear power in Germany and 75% opposed nuclear 
power in the UK (ibid).   
 
8.2: Baseline in public attitudes on nuclear: confidence in nuclear industry 
 
The figure below (fig. 24) outlines differences between countries in terms of public confidence in nuclear 
regulators, operators, and legislators, with Germany and the UK in the middle   identified   as   ‘DE’   and   ‘UK’  
respectively in 2010 before Fukushima: 
 
Figure 24: Public confidence in nuclear regulators, operators, and legislators 
 
Source: NEA (2010) 
What can be seen is that the UK demonstrates only marginally greater levels of public trust in nuclear 
regulators and operators than Germany. Confidence of legislation is indicated by the size of the bubble, and 
what can be seen is that there is a greater level of confidence in legislation in Germany, and Germany also 
appears to have greater levels of trust in legislation than France.  Similarly in the 1980s following Chernobyl, 
Peters et al (1987 quoted in Renn, 1990), outlined that 60% of Germans surveyed found Federal Government 
and institutions surrounding nuclear power to be totally trustworthy. 
 
8.3 Baseline in public attitudes on nuclear: perception of nuclear risk 
53 
 
The figure below (fig. 25) details the important factor of perceived knowledge and perceived risks of nuclear 
technology in different countries including both countries that have nuclear power as part of their energy mix 
and some that do not.  
 
Figure 25: Perceived knowledge and perception of risks of nuclear power 
 
Source: NEA (2010) 
Perceptions of risk and perceived levels of personal knowledge related to nuclear power also play an 
important  role  in  forming  overall  opinions  related  to  nuclear.  As  stated  in  the  NEA  report  “…people  who  feel  
informed about nuclear safety tend to perceive less  risk  than  those  who  feel  uninformed”  (NEA,  2010:  23).  The  
claim that opposition to nuclear power is simply the result of a knowledge deficit continues to be repeated 
elsewhere (House of Commons Science and Technology Committee, 2012). Related to these points, the results 
in relation to Germany require further examination. Germany displays more perceived knowledge of nuclear 
power yet has a greater proportion of respondents who believe the risk outweighs the advantages than the UK 
(fig. 25), with lower levels of knowledge, yet a greater proportion who believe the advantages outweigh the 
risks. It is also worth pointing out that Germany has a greater proportion of respondents who believe that the 
advantages outweigh the risks than France, which despite having the electricity supply most dominated by 
nuclear power, has lower levels of knowledge perception and a greater proportion of respondents who believe 
the risks outweigh the advantages. Thus, no clear conclusions can be formed through risk perception as again 
the German picture complicates simplistic conclusions.  
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8.4 Maximal Scale of protests 
Both the UK and Germany had rapid rises in opposition to nuclear power with the growth of the Green 
movement and NGOs in the 1970s. In terms of direct action protest both the UK and Germany had protest 
movements against nuclear power however the protests in Germany were more sustained and involved far 
greater numbers than the UK . In the UK these formed around the construction of Torness in the late 1970s 
which saw a series of protests involving 5 to 10 thousand people (Welsh, 2001). Such direct action protest died 
down in the 1980s as public inquiries became the favoured route of challenging nuclear power on the part of 
NGOs (Wynne, 2010). In Germany the maximal scale of protests were greater and more confrontational. The 
protests against the construction of the Brokdorf reactor, 45 miles West of Hamburg, are widely identified as 
being particularly important point in the generation of the German anti-nuclear movement  (Mecklin, 2013; 
Glaser, 2013; Rucht, 1990) There were also notable protests against the Kalkar Fast Breeder reactor, and in 
1981 100,000 protested against the construction of the Wyhl nuclear power station (Mecklin, 2013). It must be 
noted that the protests did not transform into change of policy in the early 1980s. In fact, funding of 
renewables was cut and more favourable attitudes towards nuclear power became apparent in Government. 
Whilst UK protests faded, large-scale German protests continued against nuclear waste trains in the 
1990s,however in 2011 the biggest protests since Torness took place against the construction of Hinkley C in 
the UK (BBC News, 2011b).  
8.5 intensity of public debate including media mentions 
In the general political sphere  an  indication  of  the  ‘visibility’  of  debate  around  nuclear  power  can  be  seen  from  
the  way   that  policy   actors   regularly   refer   to   a   ‘consensus’   in   favour  of  nuclear  power   (for example, Hutton 
quoted in Milne, 2011). Whilst clearly a political move to attempt to create certainty for new nuclear on the 
part of nuclear advocacy, such statements generally pass without controversy and it would be fair to say, 
would not be possible to make in Germany. The UK debate has been characterised as being dominated by a 
‘securitisation’  discourse   (Toke, 2013) where  options  for  deliberation  are   limited  by  discussions  of   ‘the   lights  
going  out’  and  threats  of  climate  change.  Certainly,  the  range  of  issues  discussed  in  new  consultation  systems  
in the UK are less diverse than   in   the   1980s   public   inquiry   system   arguably   representing   a   ‘post-political’  
situation (Johnstone, 2014), where wide ranging debate is often limited by a singular focus on C02 emissions 
alone   ‘trumping’   other   ethical   considerations   producing   a   ‘reluctant acceptance’   (Bickerstaff, Lorenzoni, 
Pidgeon, Poortinga, & Simmons, 2008; Corner et al., 2011) whereas clearly the issue remains politicised in 
Germany. Wittneben (2012) suggests that media reporting in Germany was more detailed and long-lasting in 
terms of coverage of the Fukushima disaster whereas in the UK attention was replaced on other issues, 
representing generally higher levels of reporting on nuclear issues in Germany than the UK.     
 
Çeteris paribus proposition 
Given the historic strength of anti-nuclear protest movements and stronger public sentiments against nuclear 
power, discontinuation could be said to be more likely in Germany than the UK. 
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9.0 Comparison of democratic qualities 
This  section  is  utilised  to  place  specific  focus  on  studies  that  have  been  used  to  ‘rank’  and  ‘compare’  qualities  
of democracy. Below, different comparative assessments of democratic quality are set out as they relate to 
Germany and the UK: 
 
9.1 Majoritarian vs consensual democracies 
Table 17: Majoritarian (UK) and consensual (Germany) comparison 
 Majoritarian Consensual 
Executive power Concentration of executive 
power in single party 
Power-sharing in coalitions 
Executive-Legislative 
relationships 
Executive is dominant Executive-legislative balance 
Party system Two party system Multi-party system 
Voting system Disproportionate 
representation 
Proportional representation 
Interest group systems Pluralist interest groupings with 
‘free-for-all’  competition 
Coordinated and corporatist 
interest group systems aimed 
at compromise and 
concentration 
 
Source: Lijphart, (2012) 
The table above stems from work classifying different ‘patterns’  of  democracy  (Lijphart, 2012;  Lijphart, 2002). 
Lijphart’s   work   categorises   a   key   difference   between   ‘majoritarian’   and   ‘consensual’   democracies,   which  
provides a useful distinction between Germany and the UK. The  ‘Westminster  model’  is  used  as  the  archtypical  
example of a majoritarian democracy in Lijphart’s  categorisations    whereas  Germany  is  considered  to  be  more 
of a consensual democracy. Although of course there are many nuances in the on-going transformations in 
British and German political systems,  Lijphart’s (2012: 7-8) conclusion is that “…consensus  democracies  scores  
significantly higher on a wide array of indicators of democratic quality and they also have better records with 
regards  to  governing  effectiveness”.   
9.2 Democracy Barometer ranking 
The Democracy Barometer project categorises and assesses qualities of democracy across 30   ‘established’  
democracies  judging  each  case  in  relation  to  3  ‘principles’  and  nine  ‘functions’  including  ‘freedom’  (individual  
liberties,  rule  of  law,  public  sphere),  ‘control’  (competition,  mutual  constraints, Governmental capability), and 
‘equality’  (transparency,  participation,  representation)  (Bühlmann, Merkel, Müller, & Weßels, 2011). Countries 
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are ranked accordingly, and again provide a stark contrast between the UK and Germany where Germany is 
ranked 11th scoring 73.2 and the UK is ranked at number 26 with a score of 44.6 (Hall, 2011). 
9.3 Economist intelligence Unit rating 
The   Economist   Intelligence   Unit   has   produced   an   important   report   on   ranking   democracies   in   its   ‘Index   of  
Democracy’   report   2010.   The   report   assesses   The index is based on five categories: electoral process and 
pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture (Economist 
Intelligence unit, 2010). In this ranking system Germany is rated 14th and the UK 19th.  
9.4 Global Democracy ranking 
The Global Democracy Ranking is undertaken by the Democracy Ranking Association in Vienna. The quality of 
democracy is again based around several indicators covering aspects including gender balances, press 
freedom, corruption, political party change, change of head of government, civil liberties, political rights (see 
Campbell 2008 for more details on methodology). In this rating system, Germany is ranked 8th and the UK is 
ranked 13th. 
Table 18: Summary table of democratic rankings 
Rating system German ranking  UK ranking 
Democracy Barometer 11th 26th 
Economist Intelligence Unit 2010 14th 19th 
Global Democracy ranking 8th 13th 
 
Cetaris Parabis proposition 
Given the associations in the literature between nuclear power and democratic deficits and the unequivocal 
higher   rankings   of   Germany   in   terms   of   ‘qualities   of   democracy’,   discontinuation   could   be   said   to   be  more  
likely in Germany than the UK.  
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DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 
Summary of Key Patterns 
Below is a table summarising how Germany and the UK compare under each of the nine criteria. A short text in 
each case indicates the broad picture that may be inferred from the discussion so far.  
Table 2 (repeated): Summary table of key findings 
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Comparing Dynamics ‘Within’ and  ‘Beyond’ Energy-Related Regimes 
From the above summary table, a quite clear picture emerges of the comparative implications of the dynamics 
considered under different criteria for reasonable judgements over the relative likelihood of a discontinuation 
in nuclear incumbency in Germany as compared with the UK. All else being equal, it might be expected under 
criteria concerning: (i) general market conditions; (ii) nuclear penetration in the generating mix; (iii) the 
strength of domestic nuclear manufacturing industries; and (iv) the scale and costs of available renewable 
energy resources; that Germany would be a significantly less favourable environment than the UK, for the 
successful challenge of nuclear incumbency.  
The picture is less clear under criterion (v), concerning strength of potential industrial interests in relation to 
renewables. Here, with interpretations depending on framing, a rigorous approach is to adopt a position of 
caution with respect to the hypothesis under scrutiny. The results may appear surprising given that the UK 
devoted more of its Energy R&D spend on wind energy than Germany throughout the 1980s, the period 
preceding  Germany’s  ‘take  off’  from  1990  onwards. And the findings would also suggest that things are not as 
simple as German enthusiasm for renewables being the overriding factor. Under broader criteria concerning: 
(vi) the scale of nuclear military activities; (vii) characteristics of formally institutionalised political culture; (viii) 
activities of wider social movements, and (ix) assessments of democratic quality this reverse picture also 
seems more strong, again suggesting more likely conditions for nuclear discontinuation in Germany than in the 
UK.    
So, with the current empirical political contrast being as striking as discussed earlier between the German 
phase-out of nuclear power and the prospective UK resurgence, the implications seem quite clear. On the 
basis of this evidence, those factors that appear to have been most relevant to the actual comparative course 
of events in these two countries are those that pertain not to the status or dynamics of the civil nuclear or 
wider associated energyindustries themselves (the   ‘focal   regime  configuration’), but to much more removed 
and disparate general political factors. In other words, it is difficult to understand unfolding patterns of events 
on the basis either of the direct conditions in the incumbent nuclear regime, or of the circumstances of the 
most immediately challenging renewable niches (however these are construed). Indeed, in short, the key 
factor that seems most salient to the direction of the observed contrast, might better be summarised as the 
general (encompassing and pervading) styles and conditions of democratic governance in these two countries, 
than as being directly to do with relative strengths or capacities in expertise, capabilities or resources among 
incumbents or challengers.  
Crucially, the picture here is not one in which these broader political factors beyond the focal configuration of 
incumbent and challenging regimes, are concluded to play a contributory role to promoting discontinuity. 
Instead, it appears in this case, that it is wider political dynamics and circumstances beyond the context of 
energy as a whole, that have overcome conditions operating more directly between incumbents and 
challengers, that would otherwise most likely favour continuity. This accords with other recent studies on 
similar   issues,   like   Lockwood’s   analysis   of   political   factors   bearing   on   energy   policy   in   the  UK   and  Germany  
(Lockwood, 2014a), which suggest that wider political dynamics are  not  best  approached  as  ‘additional factors’  
to incumbent/challenger relations. Making a similar point, but with regard to ‘landscape’  dynamics, Kern and 
Mitchell (2010) highlight contrasting responses to more general ideological conditions like global 
neoliberalism. But the resulting processes across multiple discursive media and diverse contexts are (for 
reasons discussed earlier) poorly characterised in a threefold vertical ontology setting   ‘the  regime’  under  an  
overarching landscape and above nested niches. This supports the theoretical discussion offered earlier, that 
in order to appreciate more intimate relational dynamics in particular contextual settings, it may be necessary 
to employ a more nuanced and variegated picture, free of set-piece categories. This will be returned to below. 
For its part, the pattern under criterion (viii) means particular further attention is warranted with respect to 
the activities of social movements and public opinion. Here, an explanatory casual factor could simply relate to 
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a  particular  ‘framing  struggle’  or  ‘size  of  protest  movement’  or  ‘presence  of  the  Green  Party’  in  Germany  than  
the UK. Examples from other contexts point towards things not being so simple however.  This factor of social 
movements   and   ‘framing   struggles’   is well explored in wider literatures concerning conditions for 
destabilisation of sociotechnical regimes (Geels & Verhees, 2011; Penna & Geels, 2012; Turnheim & Geels, 
2012). And in the above comparison of the cases of nuclear incumbency in the UK and Germany, this factor 
seems strongly in alignment with the observed trend. And of course, the role of anti-nuclear movements in 
driving Germany’s  nuclear  discontinuation is more widely commented on – acknowledging the large scale and 
high profile of the German protest culture that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s as contributing to a long-
standing broader climate of concern over nuclear power (Rucht, 1990). As described in the above empirical 
discussion, Germany certainly had many extremely large and important protests involving hundreds of 
thousands of people. And – as compared here – the UK did over decades display markedly lower intensities of 
large scale direct action protest activity.  
Indeed, one of the most common casually-attributed reasons for the distinctive German experience in this 
field, highlights the role of the German anti-nuclear movement as the overriding driver of Germany’s  policy  of  
nuclear phase out (Rucht, 1990). Of course, ease and efficacy of grassroots social mobilisation is in itself quite 
closely related to broader notions of democracy. But taken on its own, it may be overly simplistic. Indeed, 
there arises a potentially significant qualifying point. Germany is not alone in experiencing very strong anti-
nuclear mobilisation. For instance, protests involving hundreds of thousands of people also occurred against 
nuclear power in France (Kitschelt, 1986). Yet this is a country currently displaying the highest share in the 
world of nuclear power in its electricity generation and which (despite some recent signs) maintains a strong 
commitment to a continued nuclear strategy. Equally, in Spain, arguably the largest anti-nuclear protest ever 
to have taken place, involved more than 200,000 people in 1977 (Rudig, 1990). But this was not at the time (or 
for many years afterwards) associated with any tangible concerted high-level move against the then-
continuing incumbency of nuclear power (ibid). Looking further afield, large scale protests against the building 
of new power plants in Taiwan in 2013 have similarly failed to exert an effect comparable with that in 
Germany (Sun, 2013). Similarly, large and increasingly violent protests against nuclear power have also been 
ongoing for years in India, which also continues a nuclear strategy (Doherty, 2011).  
So, national political propensities to very large anti-nuclear direct action mobilisations, are not restricted to 
Germany. Yet these developments elsewhere are not associated with the same kind of high-level political 
turnaround. In short, many countries experiencing the most intensive anti-nuclear mobilisations nonetheless 
persisted in adherence to incumbent nuclear trajectories. And this includes not only diverse contexts like 
Taiwan  and  India,  whose  standing  as  ‘democratic’  polities  is  broadly  significant,  but  open  to  periodic  question  
(Leib & He, 2006; Li, 1997; Sen, 2005). It also includes countries like France and Spain, with specific forms of 
liberal   western   European   (supposedly)   ‘democratic’   governance   that   are   ostensibly   quite   similar   to   those  
practised in Germany and which are widely reckoned to provide for broadly similar degrees of responsiveness 
to citizen concerns.  
With respect specifically to the UK, it is also important in this regard, that social movement activity is not the 
sole indicator of political pressure considered under criterion (viii). Perhaps even more important is the status 
of general public opinion. And in this respect, the apparently marked contrast between the UK and Germany 
with respect to protest intensity, is much less pronounced with regard to more general patterns in public 
support or scepticism over nuclear power. As also discussed under criterion (viii), the balance of public opinion 
over nuclear power in the UK and Germany is actually rather similar, when compared with the background 
patterns across European countries more widely. So, it appears that the power and intensity of anti-nuclear 
movements is not a factor that can fully account on its own, for the German contrast with the UK (Stirling, 
2014a). 
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The long-time presence of the Green Party in German politics has also been quite persuasively noted as an 
important factor in determining the trajectory of nuclear policy compared to the UK (Wittneben, 2012). 
However, the presence of the Green Party in Germany cannot be divorced from conditions also bearing on the 
discussion   of   ‘qualities   of   democracy’,   hinging to the degree that it does on the difference between 
proportional and majoritarian voting systems, as well as centralised structures of government compared to 
decentralised ones. And Finland also provides an interesting counter-case for the concluding that prominent 
participation by Green Parties in political life is of itself an overriding factor, rather than being embedded in 
wider contextual aspects. Finland was the location where a Green Party was first part of a government in 1995 
(Carter, 2007) and has been subsequently, yet Finland is one of the few countries in Europe that is still 
constructing new nuclear power (World Nuclear Association, 2015d).  
Again, what seems to be required in addition is broader attention not only to other structures and processes in 
wider governance, but to the various ways in which diverse institutions, procedures, discourses and interests 
are – in the most general of political senses – enabling or suppressive of the kind of democratic exercise of 
dissenting agency that seems so strongly implicated in the capacity to discontinue an entrenched techno-
institutional system. In short, this study therefore raises a question as to whether one of the most crucial 
factors in the success or failure of incumbent-challenger dynamics in large scale sociotechnical transformation 
like the discontinuation of nuclear power, may actually lie to a neglected extent in the conditions bearing on 
the general status  of   ‘democratic  governance’ in the widest of senses – concerning myriad situated kinds of 
capacities to enable the challenging of multiple forms and dimensions of incumbent power (Stirling, 2014a; 
2014b). 
 
Implications of – and for – ‘Democracy’ 
The ninth criterion applied here illuminates clear   differences   in   the   quite   diversely   construed   ‘qualities   of  
democracy’   displayed   by   Germany   and   the   UK   (Bühlmann, Merkel, Müller, et al., 2011; Campbell, 2008; 
Lijphart, 2012; Lijphart, 2002; Munk, 2012). What is especially compelling, is that the overall picture remains 
constant, despite the detailed contrasts in the characterising of what might constitute the particular qualities 
of democracy in question.    
It was reviewed earlier how development of nuclear power has long been argued in various quarters to be 
associated   with   various   ‘democratic   deficits’   (Blowers   &   Pepper,   1987;   Massey,   1988;   Schrader-Frechette, 
1980), a point that continues to be argued (Sovacool & Valentine, 2010, 2012). So, a speculative further 
scoping of the wider implications of the above findings, might undertake a similar correlative approach to give 
a provisional indication of relations for  countries more widely between commitments to nuclear power and 
democratic rankings. By reference both to the Democracy Barometer project and the Economist Intellegence 
Index of Democracy, it is evident to a degree that measured ‘levels’  of  democracy’ provide a rough indicator of 
nuclear commitment. Those European countries constructing new nuclear power do tend to lie lower in the 
various rankings. For example, in the Economist intellegence Unit rankings only the first 26 countries are 
considered  to  be  ‘full  democracies’,  with  those positioned between 27 and 79 in the rankings being classified 
as  ‘flawed  democracies’.The two tables below, detail the rankings of countries attempting the construction of 
new nuclear in both the Economist Intellegence Ranking and the Democracy Barometer project: 
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Table 19: Ranking of countries attempting the construction of new nuclear power on the Economist 
Intellegence  Unit’s  ranking  of  democracies  2010 
 
 
Country Ranking in 
Economist 
Intelligence Unit, 
2010 democracy 
ranking 
Finland 7th  
Czech Republic 16th  
UK 19th 
France 31st  
Slovakia  38th  
Hungary 43rd  
Poland 48th  
Bulgaria 51st  
 
 
Table 20 Ranking of countries attempting to construct new nuclear reactors in the Democracy Barometer 
project 
Country Ranking in 
Qualities of 
democracy 
Barometer 
assessment of 30 
democracies 
Finland 2nd 
Czech Republic 21st 
UK 26th  
France 27th  
Poland 28th  
South Africa 29th  
 
However, it is important to acknowledge exceptions to this picture. Finland is also a country planning new 
nuclear build, yet lies relatively high in democratic rankings (7th on the Economist ranking, and 2nd on the 
Democracy Barometer). Although just one country among several others showing the preponderant reverse 
patten, this does put any simple interpretation into question, suggesting a more complicated picture and 
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requiring attention to detail. But what does remain clear, is that wider patterns across larger numbers of 
countries than the two focused on in detail here, certainly do not refute the general salience of the hypothesis 
emerging from the present study: that qualities of democracy are more relevant than often conceded to 
nuclear discontinuity in particular and (potentially) technological discontinuity in general. Whether this might 
be due to effects of democratic culture on forms taken by energy strategies, or by countervailing impacts of 
nuclear strategies on democracy itself, must remain moot – alongside many other such details. But there does 
seem sufficient evidence for a possible association, that further sociotechnical research might usefully focus 
more closely on this question. And this raises potentially important general issues for the analysis of 
sociotechnical change, which this last section will explore. 
Identifying a series of factors or forces that are said to contribute to shaping the direction of any large scale 
sociotechnical change necessarily de-contextualises the phenomena that are prioritised for attention. Notions 
of  ‘democracy’  are  no  exception.  And,  of course, this is neither unusual, nor is it necessarily wrong in itself. The 
foregrounding of particular parameters necessarily backgrounds others and is an unavoidable aspect of any 
systematic comparative research. In the light of earlier conceptual discussion in this paper, the main risk about 
which to be most vigilant and prudent, is to avoid a situation in which categories are used in a circular fashion: 
both framing the analysis in advance and mediating the interpretation of results. Where this occurs, 
highlighted factors may be attributed undue causal roles in and off themselves, more on the grounds of their 
subjective visibility and facility in the analytical framework than from any objective salience. This may be a 
danger, for instance, with ostensibly discrete and neatly partitioned ‘levels’  of  analysis,   (with   ‘the  regime’   in  
the  middle  and  ‘the  landscape’  and  niches  on  either side). As discussed earlier, this may suppress attention to 
relations and dynamics that are more polythetic, multivalent and radically ambiguous – where formative 
processes are more  horizontal  with  parallel  phenomena,  rather  than  vertical  to  other  ‘levels’. 
As was discussed at the beginning of this paper, it is in such general ways, that apparently distinguishing 
features in case study research may often be at least as reflective of the conditions of a researching subject as 
of the researched object (Haraway, 2004). So particular care is necessary, with regard to whether relatively 
less visible but nonetheless highly relevant factors may have been missed. Fortunately, the form of the 
presently emerging hypothesis is itself a guard against the worst consequences of this syndrome. What is 
argued here, is that general qualities in wider political culture that are under-specified in prevailing theory, 
may assume greater importance in understanding the contrasting cases, than do some of the particular 
explicitly and categorically-identified dynamics around the focal regime configurations. It is not necessary to be 
precise as to the exact nature of these general qualities, in order for the point about relative emphasis to 
remain salient. The argument is about appreciative understanding rather than causal explanation. And it rests 
abductively on the patterns of evidence gathered here in relation to a wide range of examined parameters, 
rather than on relatively deductive application – or a supposedly inductive test – of a particular prior 
explanatory framework. 
But it may be useful to discuss some of the more general issues that are raised by this emerging finding. Other 
approaches may be relevant. For instance, (though not unrelated to understandings of diverse forms of 
democracy) a ‘varieties of capitalism’ approach may offer useful insights in understanding the different 
practices related to market intervention and market steering which are used to differentiate between 
‘coordinated’  and  ‘market’  economies of kinds held to be exemplified in Germany and the UK respectively. In 
their analysis of renewable energy financing policies, Toke & Lauber (2007) identify key differences between 
‘Anglo-Saxon’ and ‘German’ responses to neoliberalism, and how these different contextual responses to 
neoliberal hegemony enable very different outcomes. Here, German Feed-in-Tariffs were more interventionist 
in terms of deliberately creating new markets for renewable technologies whereas the UK Renewables 
Obligation’ was less interventionist in terms of leaving the market largely as it was and thereby aligning more 
with the general principles of neoliberalism as they are widely understood (Harvey, 2007). In reflecting 
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capacities to assert deliberate collective agency in the face of overbearing global pressures, this contrast in 
itself raises an important aspect of what might be thought  of  as  a  significant  ‘quality  of  democracy’. 
On similar lines, recent work has focussed on the lack of attention in transitions literature towards these 
broader contextual conditions which extend beyond a particular (notionally singular) technological regime and 
can  be  seen  in  approaches  using  ‘policy  paradigms’ as a focal point of analysis (Hall, 1993; Kern, Kuzemko, & 
Mitchell, 2014; Kern & Mitchell, 2010),  as  well  as  ‘policy  mixes’  (Rogge & Reichardt, 2013). Relating paradigms 
to what they hold to be the under-conceptualised   ‘landscape’   level  of   the  Multi-Level Perspective, Kern and 
Mitchell (2010: 14), discuss prior political commitments towards market liberalisation which runs across 
various regimes in the UK. They argue that “…political landscape factors constrain transition governance at the 
regime level”. This again reflects a point made repeatedly in this paper concerning the sufficiency of a 
hierarchical ontology, for dynamics that are more horizontal and pervasive (Stirling, forthcoming). Either way, 
Kern and Mitchell hold this to be a crucial factor slowing the  UK’s  push  towards  similar  market  interventions to 
those achieved in Germany in order to promote a shift towards sustainability. Again, the conjunction of an 
attributed common aim, but a differential delivery holds implications for the relative strength of capabilities to 
enact democratic agency. 
Also related to broader contextual dynamics, Kuzemko (2014) has drawn attention to processes of 
politicisation and depoliticisation within energy paradigms. This analysis outlines how the differing ‘political 
capacities’ of particular actors  to enact more directed transitions to sustainability are potentially diminished 
by paradigmatic factors, in this case commitments to market liberalisation. Related to the idea of political 
capacities Lockwood (2013) discusses the importance of broader political commitments in enabling social-
technical transitions, giving the example of the challenges of sustaining the Climate Act 2008 and its potential 
instability due to political challenge. Again, a difference in capacities to undertake explicitly (and so 
accountably) political agendas in the face of default pressure towards otherwise relatively technical 
managerial compliance with incumbent global market pressures also relates to crucial qualities of democracy. 
In a discussion elsewhere of the comparative differences between renewable energy policies in Germany and 
the UK, Lockwood (2014a) (like Toke and Lauber) again notes propensities in Germany for more direct 
intervention in markets as opposed to the less interventionist approach of Britain. The focus of these accounts 
on the broader contextual and institutional frameworks which enable or constrain certain policy decisions 
moves the debate forward considerably.   
Whilst regime theoretic approaches  focusing  on  ‘sustainable transitions’ offer compelling accounts of the ways 
in which particular technologies evolve in a certain context, the question of why certain kinds of policies are 
arrived at in certain contexts and not others, as well as why certain policies are sustained in certain contexts 
and not others, is often insufficiently explored (ibid). Simple comparative questions over why certain decisions 
are   ‘possible’ in one policy context and   deemed   ‘impossible’ in another - in this case, the possibility of a 
sustainability trajectory without nuclear power in Germany, and the ‘impossibility’ of achieving sustainability 
without nuclear power in the UK context, is also left largely unexplored. This again relates to the foreclosure of 
the political in particular contexts (Johnstone,   2014;   Swyngedouw,   2009;   Žižek,   1999), where certain issues 
assume  the  status  of  ‘scientific  necessity’  rather  than  political  ‘choices’  open  to deliberation. Again, where this 
happens, qualities of democracy might be thought correspondingly attenuated.  
For his part, Lockwood (2014a: 12) goes on to argue that “the   importance   of   context   for   policy   feedback  
effects suggests that differences in speeds and paths of green transformation in different countries may be 
related to institutional diversity across   countries”. This influences what can be considered as the ‘political  
opportunities’ (Cowell & Owens, 2006; Kitschelt, 1986) available to particular actors, and the ways in which the 
legitimacy of certain discourses related to differing sustainable transitions become apparent. Whilst work on 
‘policy  paradigms’  and   institutional   variations  has   significantly advanced these discussions, they may still be 
loosely thought of as examining the conditions which enable or constrain particular decisions to be made or 
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policies to be pursued. But at present, they yield a fairly static picture of patterns of agency among different 
actors understood in the context of distributions and gradients of power within differing institutional 
configurations. It therefore seems there is considerable further work to be done on distributional and power 
issues. Relating closely to the final criterion in the present analysis on ‘qualities  of  democracy’, issues of equity 
are also significantly under-explored in the general sustainable transitions literature. Distribution is an 
inherently   ‘horizontal’   rather   than   ‘vertical’   concept   of   a   kind that can easily get lost in an ontology of 
structured  ‘levels’.  McCormack,  for  instance,  shows  how  ‘decisions’  and ‘policies’  can be understood as being 
distributed spatially and temporally (McCormack, 2011), with different actors enabled and constrained in 
various ways by ‘horizontal’  relations across the interactions between discourse, actors and institutions, and 
the ways paradigms themselves are transformed. 
Perhaps relevant here, is that Jhagroe & Loorbach (2014) in defending regime theory, nonetheless 
acknowledge the need for further research focussed on comparing different transition contexts related to 
matters pertaining to democracy. Likewise, associating   this   with   ‘landscape’   processes,   Hess & Mai (2014) 
argue  for  further   investigation  of  ‘varieties’  of   factors that determine political capacities to enact sustainable 
transitions  going  beyond  the  focus  on  ‘regime’. Here again, they explicitly identify democracy as a key factor 
which correlates with greater levels of commitment towards policies designed to pomote renewable energy. 
Such recent developments strongly chime with the present analysis. Perhaps more crucial to transformative 
change   than   structured   'vertical’   interactions   in   an   ontology   of   ‘levels’,   are   complex   multidimensional   and  
multivalent   ‘polythetic’   relational distributions of power, implicating many kinds of agency on the part of 
diverse (often horizontally-interacting) actors. It is these forms of agonistic struggle, articulated in unruly ways 
in multiple specific contexts outside the generalised order of formally-recognised institutional levels, that 
remain significantly understudied in conventional transitions approaches (Stirling, 2014b). But it is with regard 
to these multifarious dynamics of power, that consideration of different  ‘qualities of democracy’  that come to 
the fore in the present study, may be most relevant and operational to understanding of contexts for 
sociotechnical transformation and discontinuity. This also chimes with work elsewhere, like wider 
transformations in democracy itself, as the contiuing co-constitution of ‘emergent  publics’  (Barnett & Bridge, 
2013; Marres, 2007) and technological evolution that challenge the conventional confines of representative 
democracy (Dewey, 1927) as well as many themes related to a perceived democratic crisis at present 
(Bühlmann et al., 2011; Crouch, 2004; Latour, 2007). 
So, though it raises potentially profound issues for conventional theoretical approaches to sociotechnical 
change, the present case study seems in good company in these debates (Hendriks, 2009; Hess & Mai, 2014; 
Jhagroe & Loorbach, 2014; Shove & Walker, 2007). What seems to be needed, are alternative frameworks for 
understanding and action. These need not be seen as competing substitute theories, in a manner reminiscent 
of the totalising vertical processes highlighted in regime theory itself. Instead of   attempting   to   “see   like  
power”,   they might instead be understood more horizontally – as diverse complementary contributions to 
both understanding and action (Stirling, forthcoming). The response need not be the building of a single 
increasingly   elaborated,  ostensibly  objective,   ‘Cartesian’   explanatory   scheme,   then   – for instance structured 
such as apparently to include democracy itself within its specified mechanics. Such a totalising framework may 
be usefully provocative, and should not be dismissed. As identified at the beginning of this paper, such grand 
explanatory frameworks can be essential to discipline building and policy justification alike. But where they can 
become especially problematic, is where they serve as a suppressive force on the emergence of what may be 
incommensurable modes of heuristic understanding, rather than causal explanation.  
To conclude this exploration of the possible conceptual implications of this analysis for understanding 
sociotechnical discontinuity, it might be useful to sketch some of key aspects of alternative – potentially 
complementary – approaches to understanding the possible roles of qualities of democracy. Perhaps the most 
fruitful way to approach this challenge is to focus at root on the many complex dimensions and modalities 
associated with diverse dynamics of power (Bourdieu, 1998; Gramsci, 1971; Luhmann, 1995; Lukes, 2005; Sen, 
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2000; Simon, 1991; VeneKlasen & Miller, 2002). This may help sharpen analytical resolution – and avoid 
romanticism or special pleading concerning particular normative notions or claims around democracy. One 
such approach begins by characterising power itself as a relational process – involving ‘asymmetrically 
structuring agency’  (Stirling, 2014b). This is not a synoptic Cartesian structure for building apparently complete 
and definitive objective explanatory frameworks, mapping coordinates from the notional   “eagle eye   view” 
(Allouche, Middleton, & Gyawali, 2014), “seeing   like  power”   in   the   fashion  mentioned   earlier   in   this   paper 
(Stirling, forthcoming). Instead, it offers a means to more plural and situated heuristic understandings, based 
on polar coordinates that are explicitly qualified by the subjective focus – a portable compass from an 
acknowledged  “toad’s  eye  view” (Allouche, Middleton, & Gyawali, 2014).  
Depending on what broadly distinctive characters of wider power relations thereby come to light, then, what 
comes to the fore in seeking to understand any specific instance of sociotechnical discontinuation, are the 
irreducibly general dynamics displayed in encompassing political cultures at large. Relating to holistic 
properties bearing on political economy (Blyth, 2009), civic epistemology (Jasanoff, 2005) and varieties of 
capitalism (P. A. Hall & Siskice, 2001; Hancke, Rhodes, & Thatcher, 2007), a diversity of wider social norms, 
institutions and discourses constitute a variety of modalities for the concentration and dissipation of disparate 
flows and contours of social and material agency (Buss & Overton, 2002; Knappett & Malafouris, 2008). It is 
general distinctions between these overall patterns in the general fabrics of power relations associated with 
particular polities, which may from time to time form potential decisive factors in achieving particular large 
sociotechnical discontinuities. It is the resulting general question of democracy that might easily be missed by 
an overly specific focus on the specific conditions of incumbency and challenge themselves.  
So, it is (ironically) in these broadest of senses situated on different meanings and contexts of power, that 
concepts of   ‘qualities of democracy’  may  be  seen  as  most  fruitful   for  operationalising   in  the  specific  analytic  
task  faced  here.  In  these  terms,  ‘democracy’  refers  not  to  any  formally  structured  constitutional  or  procedural  
end-state (Laclau, 1996), but to a general institutional and discursive capacity to sustain diverse, complex, 
distributed processes of ongoing struggle (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001; Marcuse, 1969; Smith, 2003). In short 
‘qualities of democracy’  refer  to  the  many  kinds  of  ways  in  which  an  encompassing  political  environment may 
afford  ‘access by the least powerful, to capacities for challenging power’  (Stirling, 2014a). This may be as true 
of the power of an incumbent sociotechnical regime like that around nuclear energy, as of any other particular 
political, economic or infrastructural instance of asymmetrically structured agency. Even though it may mean 
different particular things under differing perspectives, then, it is in this way that the apparently very general 
concept  of   ‘democracy’  may  nonetheless  be  relevant   in  rigorously focused analysis of the present kind. And 
the concept is certainly relevant (as we shall see), when turning to the question of the kinds of normative 
recommendations that might be made. 
What makes all this conceptual deliberation about democracy relevant to the present specific discussion, is 
that these irreducibly pervasive features of encompassing political structures and arenas, may tend to be 
somewhat neglected in much current literature bearing on the conditions for technological discontinuation. 
Here, analysis of various kinds tends to focus on developing specific reductive explanations, rather than 
general appreciative understandings (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Weber, 1978). Despite the presently necessarily coarse 
grain characterisation of the concept  of  ‘democracy’  in terms of general capacities for challenging power, the 
implications may therefore be especially potentially significant for prevailing interpretations of incumbent-
challenger interactions.  
Of course, as has been discussed, there does exist a considerable subset of literature acknowledging the 
general importance to large scale sociotechnical change of wider political and cultural dynamics (F. W. Geels, 
2014; Geels & Verhees, 2011; Kern, Smith, Shaw, Raven, & Verhees, 2014; Meadowcroft, 2009; Smith, Kern, 
Raven, & Verhees, 2013; Smith & Stirling, 2010). And in other areas of literature, the issues raised here might 
be referred to as features of a notionally singular overarching  ‘landscape’,  that  helps  to  condition  processes  at  
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the level of ‘the’ regime (Rotmans, Kemp, & Asselt, 2001). As a portmanteau for a diverse collection of often-
unspecified factors that extend beyond the structural confines of a regime, this is tautologously true. But 
divergent democratic qualities are rarely observed to constitute the formative distinctions between 
landscapes. And anyhow, the observation made here concerning the potential importance of democracy, goes 
beyond any landscape metaphor at all. It refers not to a vertically superordinate structural ‘level’   subject 
mostly to long-run secular trends and remote to familiar notions of agency. Instead, experience of democracy 
as ‘access by the least powerful, to capacities for challenging power’   is   (whether restrictive or enabling) a 
pervasively embedded horizontally engaging mlieu for the direct exercise over many timescales of various 
kinds of agency. 
And   whether   conceived   explicitly   or   implicitly   as   embodied   in   ‘landscapes’,   there   also   emerges   a   further  
crucially distinct feature in the present analysis. In that part of the existing literature that takes account of 
broader social and political aspects, these are typically advocated in addition to more concentrated attention 
on the dynamics operating within and around the focal configuration of nested contiguous and overlapping 
sociotechnical regimes. It is rare to find an emphasis on such wider contextual factors beyond this focal 
configuration, as being unequivocally more important than the dynamics operating directly between the 
incumbent regime and the context of immediate challenge. And, of course, this observation is even more 
pertinent with regard to conventional transition management and innovation studies, in which the scope of 
explanatory and prescriptive frameworks typically extend only into processes bearing most directly on a focal 
regime or sector. 
The potential significance of this discussion, then, does not lie in any claim that broadly framed, irreducibly 
holistic and normatively loaded concepts of democracy, may in all cases constitute important frameworks for 
understanding the dynamics around the challenging sociotechnical incumbency. The point is, that there exist 
pressures in existing academic literatures to tend to neglect the potential roles of these kinds of consideration. 
And the implications extend beyond simply acknowledging the potential additional significance of these 
broader factors, to dynamics at play within a sociotechnical regime and its immediate conditions of challenge. 
What may possibly be at stake here in particular cases like that of nuclear power, is an appreciation of the 
dominant considerations. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has assessed the background to key recent developments in the challenging and assertion of 
nuclear incumbency in two countries where these current dynamics are arguably most strikingly contrasting: 
the UK and Germany. It did this by means of nine criteria designed on the basis of various literatures to explore 
key relevant factors bearing on nuclear incumbency and challenge in these two countries. Despite the 
complexities, the analysis found a relatively clear picture. On the basis of five criteria concerning the dynamics 
within and around the nested and overlapping sociotechnical regime configurations relating directly to 
electricity production, it might be expected that Germany would be significantly less likely than the UK to 
discontinue nuclear power. Indeed, these criteria together predict the opposite of the observed pattern where 
it is actually in Germany that the challenge to nuclear incumbency has so far proven most successful.  
It is the four criteria that address factors operating beyond focal regime configurations (involving either 
incumbents or challengers), that are most in alignment with the observed pattern of developments. Yet these 
factors typically remain most marginal to conventional analyses of dynamics in sociotechnical systems and 
sectoral   patterns   of   innovation.   In   short,   in   these   ‘conventional’   terms,   the   UK’s   renewed   enthusiasm   for  
nuclear   in   comparison   to   Germany’s   presently implemented nuclear phase-out seems rather hard to 
understand. And since the analysis focuses on observable policy conditions and dynamics to date, the 
argument does not rely on any assumptions that similar patterns will necessarily continue into the future. 
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Building on some wider emerging literatures on these issues, the paper argues that it is crucial to the 
understanding of sociotechnical discontinuity in this case, that attention be paid to the importance of some 
broader and more general features of political institutions and discourse. Public opinion in the two countries is 
not so different as to drive such starkly contrasting policy outcomes. Levels of activity among anti-nuclear 
movements seem to be a factor, but are also evidently not decisive in themselves. Military nuclear 
commitments may well be important, but remain entirely unacknowledged in published energy policy 
documentation, so such secrecy would raise important issues around democratic accountability and discourse. 
So, it is the more general implications   around   this   theme  of   ‘qualities  of  democracy’   that   seem   to  be  most  
aligned with the observed pattern.  
Of all the detailed factors explored, it is those bearing on the complex and multidimensional issue of ‘qualities 
of democracy’, that seem most clearly to accord with a situation in which the country apparently withdrawing 
most readily from this incumbent nuclear generating technology, is the one where it is arguably more 
entrenched and successful and where alternative renewable resources are manifestly less attractive. Put 
simply, the question is raised as to whether the main reason for nuclear discontinuity occurring in Germany 
rather than in the UK, is that the latter affords less effective general opportunities for diverse kinds of 
democratic pressure and challenge.  
This is important, because – despite exceptions – general questions of democracy tend to be somewhat side-
lined in mainstream academic analysis in this field – using frameworks like those developed in transitions 
management and the multi-level perspective. And there also arise some potentially important practical 
political  implications.  A  neglect  of  the  general  importance  of  pervasive  qualities  of  ‘democracy’  may result in 
policy attention fixating unduly on potential roles for particular interventions addressing conditions within a 
specific regime and its contiguous sources of challenge. This may lead to an overly concentrated emphasis on 
relatively specific managerial measures like sectoral missions, targeted instruments, regulatory reforms, 
operating standards, fiscal adjustments, higher education provision, training capacity, research strategies, 
protective niches and so on. Without detracting from the potential importance of these kinds of instrumental 
intervention in many settings, the present analysis underscores a serious question over their sufficiency. What 
may often be required as well – or even more – than such circumscribed technical policy functions, are entirely 
more radical and transformative qualities in encompassing political environments.  
The overall contribution of this study is to substantiate a more general the question as to whether the 
successful challenge of sociotechnical incumbency may often be as much – even sometimes more – a matter 
of general democratic struggle in wider political arenas, than of narrow policy interventions in or around 
particular regimes. 
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